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 Many cities across the US have reintroduced the streetcar as an economic development 
tool, or as an image-branding and tourism-promoting amenity, while public transportation 
benefits are largely afterthoughts.  The purpose of this research is to investigate the Milwaukee 
Streetcar as a transit-oriented development strategy, the distribution of benefits and burdens, and 
its implications for equitable development.  Guided by semi-structured interviews and 
content/discourse analysis of planning/policy documents through an equity lens, this study 
analyzed Milwaukee’s initial downtown streetcar routes against the potential extension lines into 
the more transit-dependent communities of Bronzeville and Walker’s Point.  The findings 
suggest that the initial routes and possible extension lines were engaged in very different political 
and planning processes, the latter of which employed explicit attention to equitable development.  
While certain tools have been identified to address concerns of displacement resulting from 
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 Many cities across the United States are currently experiencing a resurgence of the 
modern streetcar.  In the past—prior to the automobile-centric design of cities and the 
widespread suburbanization during the post-war era—streetcars were essential for daily urban 
life and the expansion of cities, which allowed people to live further away from the pollution and 
bustle of central urban areas.  After the 1930s, President Roosevelt’s New Deal—along with the 
rise of the personal automobile and other political interventions from automakers1—fostered the 
expansion of suburbs and highways, and rendered the streetcar technology obsolete.  Since then, 
nearly all the 45,000-miles of streetcar lines in the United States have been abandoned or 
dismantled, and in Washington D.C., the last streetcar ran in 1962 (Smithsonian, n.d.).  
Currently, there are 32 cities operating streetcars in the United States, and an additional 76 cities 
are seriously considering or are in the actively planning stage of developing a streetcar system 
(APTA, 2019a, 2019b). 
The rebirth of the modern streetcar offers alternative modes of transportation, but also 
promises the benefits of increased private investment and local economic development.  Modern 
streetcar projects are hailed as catalysts for transit-oriented development (TOD), improved 
pedestrian environments and walkability, enhanced multi-modal transit services, as well as the 
enriched livability and quality of urban life in the corridors served (King & Fischer, 2016).  This 
research area is significant because in many cases, the improved efficiency and accessibility of 
the transit network are secondary to the economic benefits derived from TOD (Brown, Nixon, & 
Ramos, 2015; Culver, 2017; King & Fischer, 2016; Lowe & Grengs, 2018).  Thus, if 
transportation goals are not the main drivers of these modern streetcar projects, then the 
                                                
1 See St. Clair (1981) for a more detailed discussion of the organized campaign intent on eliminating viable public transit by GM 






questions become centered around how and where wealth is generated and distributed from 
TOD, and how to ensure and encourage development that is equitable and serves the needs of 
transit-dependent populations.  
In 2018, Milwaukee’s modern streetcar project began its operation with a 2.1-mile 
downtown loop, and is expected to begin service of its 0.4-mile lakefront extension and 0.3-mile 
Wisconsin Center extension in 2020, ahead of the Democratic National Convention.  While these 
initial streetcar routes serve the central business district of downtown Milwaukee and the 
predominately affluent neighborhoods of the Lower Eastside and Historic Third Ward, there 
have been discussions about how to extend the streetcar to reach more transit-dependent 
communities and integrate it with the overall transportation network more effectively.  With a 
focus of equitable-TOD (e-TOD) and anti-displacement, Milwaukee’s Department of City 
Development devised plans for two possible streetcar extension lines to the more transit-
dependent neighborhoods of Bronzeville and Walker’s Point.   
The purpose of this study is to examine TOD and its implications for equitable 
development in the modern streetcar resurgence era.  From an investigation of the Milwaukee 
Streetcar as a case study, this research will unpack the thinking surrounding the streetcar with a 
comparison between the planning processes of the initial routes and potential extension lines, 
evaluate the distribution of the benefits and burdens associated with TOD, and explore its 
implications for equitable development.  In other words, to what extent does the Milwaukee 
Streetcar as a TOD strategy contribute to or detract from the challenges associated with equity, 
community development, and the growing inequality in Milwaukee?   
 In the next section, the literature review will explain neoliberal urban development 






research design of this study, which will be drawing on qualitative content and discourse analysis 
of newspaper articles and planning and policy documents, and supplemented by semi-structured 
interviews with relevant stakeholders.  The following section will examine the case study of 
Milwaukee in greater detail, including the historical context of the Milwaukee Streetcar.  Next, 
the discussion section will contain a deeper analysis of the major findings from the previous 
section, and its implications for equitable development.  Finally, concluding remarks will be 
made on the limitations of this research and recommendations for future research.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Neoliberal Urban Restructuring: Entrepreneurial Cities  
Theoretical frameworks of urban political scientists have evolved over time to account 
for structural and economic changes in the distribution of power and urban governance.  Within 
contemporary urban studies scholarship, it is generally accepted that the broad pattern of urban 
restructuring in recent decades has been informed by “neoliberalism” as the key logic that is 
continuously and “profoundly shaping the ideological and operational parameters of 
urbanization” (Culver, 2017; Peck, Theodore, & Brenner, 2013, p. 1091).  Understood as both an 
ideology and a set of structural changes, neoliberalism created a permanent fiscal crisis for 
municipalities since the 1980s—due to federal government cutbacks and rollbacks, welfare 
reform, decentralization, privatization, and deregulation of the market in response to population 
shifts and the globalization of the economy.  Furthermore, intergovernmental reforms have 
dramatically reshaped the roles, functions, and jurisdictional powers of local government—






services within their limited capacities—and forced municipal managers to develop strategic and 
innovative strategies to secure and expand its tax-base and attract capital investment.   
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the effects of globalization became more visible and 
theories of structuralism—which argue that private enterprises find themselves in a privileged 
political position due to the mobility of capital—evolved to account for the shift of urban 
governance.  Harvey (1989) characterized these transformations of urban governance as a shift 
from “managerialism” to a mode of “entrepreneurialism” with the speculative investment of 
public funds to generate economic growth (MacLeod, 2011).  The decentralization of the 
government prompted municipalities to form public-private partnerships (PPPs) with a diverse 
set of actors (e.g., the private sector, non-profits, community-based organizations, non-
governmental organizations, etc.) to facilitate the general provision of services with greater 
flexibility without bureaucratic oversight, and in effect, reinforced an ever-increasing influence 
of competitive market logics over urban development (Culver, 2017; Harvey, 2005; MacLeod, 
2011; Theodore & Peck, 2011).  Hence, the neoliberalization of urban governance entailed a 
decades-long shift from the welfare-state ideal that was dedicated to serving the “public good” 
and addressing social needs, to an “entrepreneurial paradigm in spatial development” wherein 
cities compete within and across multiple geographical scales—from the global to the regional 
and down to the local level—for urban economic development (Culver, 2017; MacLeod, 2011; 
Theodore, Peck, & Brenner, 2011).  
Thus, municipal governments have been entwined with the evolution of the neoliberal 
paradigm, which favors unfettered entrepreneurialism, unencumbered free markets, individual 
property rights over collective action, and enforces ideological “market-rule” on all aspects of 






maximized by maximizing the reach and frequency of market transactions, and it seeks to bring 
all human action into the domain of the market” (Harvey, 2005, p. 3).  Departed from the city’s 
previously defined managerial role that embraced distributive and allocation focused strategies, 
in its entrepreneurial role municipalities have progressively embraced pro-growth development 
strategies, which emphasize the notion that intensive growth and development patterns have 
collective benefits to the local citizenry at large (e.g., strengthening the local tax base, creating 
jobs, meeting the local housing demand, etc.), and prioritize individual benefits and advantages 
(e.g., tax abatements, tax incremental financing districts, direct loans, zoning code changes, etc.) 
to private interests and developers (Harvey, 1989; Harris, 2015).  The market-driven 
entrepreneurial logic of the neoliberal paradigm, however, ignores the distinction between use-
values and exchange-values, and the concerns that the benefits derived from the pursuit of 
exchange-values by intensive development are unevenly distributed across the urban landscape 
(Harris, 2015; Logan & Molotch, 1987).  Rather, traditional supply-side strategies function to 
move business activity and capital across geographic locations, and tend to mitigate job and tax-
base benefits for location-specific communities within a region (Harris, 2015; Reese, 1998).   
 
Neoliberal Urban Restructuring: The City as a Growth Machine 
As an alternative to the over-deterministic structuralism theorizations of the urban 
political economy, Molotch (1976) argued that the essence of government and the key function 
of any locality is rooted in growth, and hence, coined the phrase “the city as a growth machine.”  
Molotch contextualized the political economy of the growth machine around “members of 
politically mobilized local elites” (p. 310) that have invested interests in local development and 






a clear departure from structuralism, growth machine theory combines human agency and 
human-interests with market-forces that strive for the accumulation of wealth and power as the 
key drivers of urban growth patterns, since at least the nineteenth-century.  Logan and Molotch 
(1987) identified such actors as “place-entrepreneurs” who capitalize on the exchange-values of 
urban land-use markets: either through rent-collection, buying and selling land based on market 
trends, and/or “actively involved in changing the environment of development to profit from the 
rearrangement of place” (Farahani, 2017).  Growth machine theory suggests that growth is 
considered a public good and beneficial for all, yet Molotch (1993) and Purcell (2000) highlight 
the sparse evidence that growth stimulates the acquisition of the growth machine’s acclaimed 
outcomes.  
Economic development strategies of growth machine dynamics have garnered enormous 
expenditures of federal, state, and municipal tax dollars at the local level that advanced these 
private-interests over the years, yet existing empirical evidence provides no substantive proof 
that such economic development incentives and subsidies promote or cause economic growth 
(Harris, 2015; Krumholz, 1999; Sagar, 2011).  Furthermore, Judd and Swanstrom (2010) show 
how U.S. federal aid was historically crucial for enabling municipalities to extend welfare 
services into the 1980s, until the Reagan Administration halved several aid programs, and therein 
effectively entreated municipal governments into the neoliberal entrepreneurial agenda 
(MacLeod, 2011).  Such constraints on local growth machine initiatives inspired place-
entrepreneurs to enlist a range of influential actors to achieve its agenda by forming what Logan 
and Molotch (1987) termed a “growth coalition:” 
Coalition partners can range from local and metropolitan capital in construction, finance 
and banking; professional practices in law, architecture, design and planning; city 
politicians keen to acquire sponsorship; other indirect beneficiaries of developments like 






attachments including universities, theatres, professional sports clubs, small retailers and 
labor and community groups. (MacLeod, 2011, p. 2634) 
 
The wide social base of the growth coalition not only instills ideological hegemony, but also the 
political legitimacy and unifying consensus behind citywide growth and urban development as a 
public good, and thereby effectively positioned the electorally- or politically-appointed beyond 
the purview of public accountability (Jonas & Wilson, 1999; Logan & Molotch, 1987; MacLeod, 
2011).   
 
Neoliberal Urban Restructuring: Urban Regime Theory 
A closely related but alternative perspective to analyze how municipalities have 
responded to neoliberal urban restructuring was conceptualized by Stone’s (1989, 1993, 2005) 
“urban regime theory.”  Since the 1960s, the increased mobility of capital and businesses 
required cities to adopt entrepreneurial strategies and reposition themselves to create a climate of 
business retention and spur urban development.  In attempt to bypass the “economic 
determinism” foundation of growth coalition theory (i.e., elite power over the economic 
landscape), urban regime theory seeks to examine and explain the alliances between elected 
officials and individual actors that make urban governance possible.  The study of urban regimes 
analyzes who cooperates and how their cooperation is achieved through informal arrangements 
across institutional sectors and actors, with an emphasis on political leadership and the policy 
formulation of urban development and political action.  Urban regime theory also includes an 
examination of how that cooperation is maintained when confronted with an ongoing process of 
social change, influxes of new actors, and potential breakdowns through conflicts or 
indifference.  In urban regime theory, different cities behave differently under similar economic 






markets.  Local variations of each individual case can turn out to be quite unique from city to 
city, thus, giving the rise to the framework of urban regime theory.  
Stone depicted urban regimes as having four core elements: (1) the capacity to do 
something; (2) a set of actors who do it; (3) a relationship among the actors that enables them to 
work together; and (4) the durability of these arrangements to last over some period of years 
(Stone, 1989; Thomas, 1998).  Developing this, Stone (1993) argued that urban regimes 
inevitably—despite conflicts among partners—coalesce into agenda-setting, resource 
mobilization, and coalition building.  Coalitions can range from “development regimes” (pro-
growth), “middle-class progressive regimes” (slow-growth), “maintenance regimes” (service-
delivery), or “lower-class opportunity expansion regimes” (intergovernmental), depending on its 
composition and unique historical context (Stone, 1993).  In doing so, Stone offered researchers 
variations to the patterns of urban governance beyond growth politics (MacLeod, 2011; Wood, 
2004). 
From a structuralism standpoint, there is little independence for citizens and 
policymakers to operate outside the confines of global capitalism.  However, there are always 
choices for how local political regimes react to marketplace conditions and its citizenry, 
respectively.  Likewise, Wong (1988) argues that urban policymaking can result from political 
choice as well as economic consideration.  In this same vein, Stone advanced Abrams’ (1982) 
contention that structures are relationships, and relationships are socially fabricated: real, but not 
fixed, and subject to purposive modification.  Structuring then—rather than a fixed structure—is 
the appropriate way to consider urban regimes, for Stone.  For example, regime continuity is 
dependent on the capacity to adapt or reinforce existing structures amidst the ever-present 






theory discounts the interests of the community and emphasizes the need for cooperation with 
the business-class above all else.  From an urban regime perspective, however, the demands of 
the community and their voting power hold elected officials publically accountable, and thus, 
hold some degree of power within urban politics.  The interests of the business elites and the 
interests of the community are often polarized, but it is the duty of city officials to establish an 
equilibrium between the two sides.  
Urban regime theory, thus, departs from the division of labor between the state and the 
market, and focuses attention on the themes of power and governing capability.  Instead of 
exercising social control with “power over” (whether from pluralist coalition power or elitist 
command power), urban regime theorists describe power as “power to” achieve a governing 
capacity of social production, and argue that it is highly unlikely for any one group to exercise 
absolute control over the urban landscape (MacLeod, 2011; Stone, 1989).  Instead, Stone argued 
that informal arrangements between governing bodies and private interests necessarily function 
together to make and carry out governing decisions (Stone, 1989).  Stone’s social production 
model highlights mutually beneficial interdependence within the political economic model by 
investigating who is empowering groups and drawing them into the regime, rather than exerting 
power over them.  
However, Gendron (2006) alleged that power-to and power-over are intertwined, and not 
mutually independent.  For Gendron, public-private partnerships are not necessarily voluntary, 
but rather are a form of coerced “shared power” employed to dominate and control the 
opposition.  Revisiting his earlier analysis, Stone (2005) too admitted that cooperation is not the 
norm and acknowledged that “in the US especially, business enjoys ready-made advantages as a 






favorable business climate by emphasizing how business elites with access to financial (and 
other) resources are placed in a privileged position to exert influence on regime agendas, and 
often resulting in relaxed planning regulations, low-interest loans, tax abatements, and even 
direct subsidies to private investors and developers (MacLeod, 2011).  In fact, both 
perspectives—growth coalitions and urban regimes—begin with the premise that local 
governments do not have the capacity to act or govern on their own.  The major difference 
between the two is that growth coalition theory begins with the private sector and analyzes how 
those actors influence government, whereas regime theory starts with the government and 
examines how elected officials find coalition partners in the private sector.  
 
Neoliberal Urban Development Strategies: Public-Private Partnerships 
In either case, public-private partnerships (PPPs) were fostered in the 1980s, by the 
Thatcher and Reagan Administrations respectively, as the main strategic response for urban 
development during the retrenchment era of the welfare state.  PPPs often form to reconcile the 
institutionally weak position of urban governance and gain access to the resources needed for 
redevelopment.  Justified by the presumed inefficiencies of the public sector from the “rolling-
back” of the Keynesian-welfare state and the “rolling-out” of the neoliberal state (Peck & 
Tickell, 2002), localities use PPPs to reduce government expenditures on public services and 
shrink its area of responsibility and accountability (Miraftab, 2004).  Scholars have remained 
skeptical of the preeminence of market-driven merging of public/government interests with 
private/corporate interests—arising from the assumption that developers would operate 
unchecked by the public sector and influence policy decisions—and raised concerns about the 






For example, Miraftab (2004) argued that there is a strong likelihood that PPPs would 
become a form of privatization under neoliberal policies of decentralization, and compared PPPs 
with the Trojan Horse: “Like the Trojan Horse, these partnerships might arrive with the promise 
of a gift but only to further dispossess the poor from their locally mobilized resources” (p. 98).  
Through her review of PPP literature—most of which was found to be funded and published by 
development agencies as promotional material—Miraftab uncovered a conspicuous silence.  
Little prior research provided any evidence about PPPs’ equity dimension or any documented 
records of PPPs servicing the interests of the poor.  Similarly, most research had little to say 
about whether and how such partnerships replace the public sector’s responsibility to serve the 
public good.  As Purcell (2008) put it: 
Oligarchic institutions like public-private partnerships and quasi-public agencies are 
increasingly making decisions that were formerly made by officials directly elected by 
the public ... [with] ... citizens and their representatives ... increasingly replaced in 
decision-making by panels of business leaders and economic experts who are perceived 
to know how best to respond to the competitive global market. (Purcell, 2008, p. 27, as 
cited by MacLeod, 2011, p. 2648) 
 
The underlining assumptions of PPPs advance the ideological neoliberal script by asserting that 
partnerships that are good for the market are also good for the poor—because they create jobs as 
well as economic growth—and therein conflate economic growth and poverty alleviation with an 
unexamined assumption that the wealth created by these partnerships are distributed equitably: 
Local governments that receive only limited funds from other tiers of government or 
from subsidies across public agencies are expected to raise their own revenues. To 
increase revenue, local governments are also urged to function as a private sector firm 
does, insisting on full cost recovery for services and competing to make their area more 
attractive to local or multinational investors. To gain a competitive advantage, then, local 
governments often ease regulations—among them labor or environmental protections—to 
be more ‘market-friendly’ to potential investors ... In either case, whether the state creates 
new but ineffective decentralized administrative structures or adopts the operating 
principles of the for-profit private sector, the outcome is often similar: the regulatory role 
of the government presumed to address equity in partnerships remains as toothless 







Thus, Miraftab argued that PPPs (despite their names) belong among the privatization strategies 
of the neoliberal agenda that removes public amenities from the responsibilities of government, 
and reduces the urban poor’s access to basic services. 
Despite these criticisms of PPPs, Sagalyn (2007) contended that much of the academic 
literature on the subject has misunderstood the context and complexity of such partnerships.  She 
argued that the “generalizations based on downtown [public/private] projects offered misleading 
notions of how negotiations would play out in inner-city neighborhoods and situations that 
deliberately incorporated a range of stakeholder interests” (Sagalyn, 2007, p. 12).  Instead, 
incorporating lessons learned from practice, Sagalyn showed how community benefit 
agreements—a legally enforceable contract negotiated between the developer of a project and 
organized representatives of the affected community—are part of a larger effort to produce 
“development without displacement” or “equitable development.”  Thus, for PPPs to be both 
economically successful and equitable, they require intentional mediation either by the 
community, or by the government on the behalf of the community.  
The capacity to promote equity is explicitly linked to the functional role of government, 
as well as the accountability of municipal actors for leveraging a broader set of community 
interests, thereby ensuring that the public good and social justice are promoted across a broad 
array of local and community stakeholders (Harris, 2015).  However, neoliberal development 
and urban governance restructured as an entrepreneurial and market-oriented scheme that is 
regarded to be beneficial to all social groups therein effectively places social justice and racial 
equity concerns outside the purview of the neoliberal state in favor of revenue generation (Mele, 






The role of municipal governments has transmuted from an overarching guidance of 
spatial, economic, and social order to a development pattern where all factors are 
subsidiary to economic development and the drive for economic growth, with its 
presumed result of the expansion of the municipal revenue base. (Harris, 2015, p. 5) 
 
Moreover, the functional role of municipal governments is called into question wherein the 
benefits of local economic development tend to be “privatized,” and the related risks or burdens 
of those initiatives are essentially “socialized” and borne by the local government (Barnekov & 
Rich, 1989; Harris, 2015).  In this respect, municipal governments have become a “civil service” 
for private-interests and a symbolic interface for the social good of public-interests as market-
oriented growth in the neoliberal era. 
While contemporary entrepreneurial cities deploy well-established entrepreneurial 
toolkits (i.e., public-private investment ventures, municipal real-estate speculation, place-
branding, inter-urban competition), Lauermann (2018) argued that these tools are used to pursue 
multiple political logics in parallel with growth, and suggests a more interventionist role for 
municipalities in development in three ways: 
[1] First, entrepreneurial city governments have diversified their investment and policy 
portfolios ... [to] articulate visions for urban development ... [that] marks a return to 
classical urban regime politics, [and] often means reaching beyond municipal territory to 
garner support and financing for local agendas ...  
[2] Second, entrepreneurial cities increasingly rely on experimentation rather than 
speculation. This means moving towards a variety of metrics for evaluating 
entrepreneurial ‘success’ and ‘failure’ in terms other than local economic growth. 
Historically, ... [e]ntrepreneurial projects were typically evaluated based on a return on 
investment, with return measured in the terms of growth ... New instruments like tax-
increment financing and bond derivatives allowed municipal governments to 
‘financialize’ their operations ...  
[3] Third, analysts highlight how contemporary entrepreneurial cities engage in both 
inter-urban competition and inter-urban diplomacy ... to compete more effectively, but 
also to build inter-urban cooperation in a more diplomatic fashion. (Lauermann, 2018, pp. 
213-216) 
 
In short, recent research suggests that urban politics of the entrepreneurial city are evolving as 






Yet, moving entrepreneurialism beyond growth politics does not in itself lead to more 
participatory urban politics, nor does the diversifying entrepreneurial city agendas separate itself 
from the political economic logics of profit and growth thereof (Lauermann, 2018).  The 
proliferation of entrepreneurial labels (e.g., concepts of the “creative city,” the “eco-city,” the 
“sustainable city,” the “green city,” the “smart city,” or the “inclusive city,” etc.) has allowed the 
depoliticizing of diverse agendas that can be rearticulated through the lens of growth 
(Lauermann, 2018; Swyngedouw, 2009).  Admittedly, Lauermann’s call for a post-neoliberal 
entrepreneurialism would not necessarily move beyond growth politics, but would signify that 
“entrepreneurial cities are engaged in parallel, diverging, and contradictory political agendas 
which cannot be described solely through a neoliberal analytic” (Lauermann, 2018, p. 220).   
 
Neoliberal Urban Development Strategies: Creative Cities 
A highly influential political agenda adopted by many municipalities across the United 
States in recent decades has been popularized by Florida’s (2002, 2003, 2012, 2017) “creative 
class” theory, which seeks to explain and inform the relationship between the creative class and 
economic growth.  Florida argued that cities should reorganize their built environments to 
accommodate the needs and desires of the creative class (i.e., scientists, engineers, university 
professors, programmers, designers, architects, entertainers, poets, novelists, and opinion-
makers), “whose economic function is to create new ideas, new technology, and/or creative 
content” (Florida, 2002, p. 8).  In doing so, they would then find themselves stronger and more 
prosperous than ever, because regional economic growth is driven by the specific locational 
choices of creative people (Florida, 2002; Zimmerman, 2008).  To this extent, Florida declared 






traditional working class, and argued that people do not follow jobs so much as the jobs follow 
creative people (Zimmerman, 2008).  Peck (2005) identified this tangible expression in which 
the creative class will thrive, per Florida, as the “buzzing, trendy neighborhood,” equipped with a 
multitude of informal social houses (e.g., coffeehouses, bookstores, urban recreational nightlife 
ecologies, etc.) enhanced by a presumably open and tolerant culture with a large concentration of 
bohemians and gays (Zimmerman, 2008).   
Florida argued that the success of economic development depends on a region’s ability to 
foster talent, tolerance, and technology (the “3 T’s”), and developed the “Creativity Index” to 
measure cities and regions against each other (Florida, 2002).  The Creativity Index was 
generated from four regional measures: creative class concentration (workers with creative 
occupations); the Talent Index (populations with higher-education); the Innovation Index 
(patents per capita); and a High-Tech Index based on IT software and biomedical industries 
(Sadler, 2005).  Florida (2003) later developed the “Gay Index” and “Bohemian Index” as 
indicators for tolerance of diversity, and argued that the presence of bohemians and gays are 
strong predictors for high-technology and population growth of creative capital, thereby making 
his contribution to the “human capital” conversation expressively cultural (Zimmerman, 2008).  
Despite heavy criticism from many scholars (Culver, 2017; Glaeser, 2005; Maliszewski, 2004; 
Peck, 2005; Storper & Scott, 2009; Zimmerman, 2008), Florida’s theories have been championed 
and adopted by several municipalities across the United States as part of their “creative city 
development toolkits” nested within the neoliberal entrepreneurial logic to attract the creative 
class (Collis, Felton, & Graham, 2010).  This happened to be especially the case in slow-growth 
metropolitan areas of post-industrial rustbelt cities that have experienced decades of relative 






Of the many critiques, prominent among them were those that questioned Florida’s 
assumptions about the relationship between the creative class and economic growth, as well as 
the extent to which the statistical analyses of index indicators were empirically grounded and 
could hold indicative value that would be predictive of economic growth.  For example, Glaeser 
(2005) ran regressions on Florida’s Bohemian Index data and found that there was very little 
independent effect from bohemian concentrations after controlling for young college-educated 
adults (as cited in Zimmerman, 2008).  Kotkin and Siegel (2004) showed that Florida’s creative 
urban hub clusters exhibited above average unemployment rates compared to other areas of the 
metropolis (as cited in Zimmerman, 2008).  Likewise, Malanga (2004) argued that the existence 
of “bohemian neighborhoods” was most likely a consequence of economic growth, rather than a 
cause of it, and that Florida’s argument was entirely based on circular logic (as cited by 
Zimmerman, 2008).   
Furthermore, the intensifying of socioeconomic inequalities has been among the most 
critical observations of case-study research conducted on creative city practices (Culver, 2017; 
Grodach, 2013; Maliszewski, 2004; Peck, 2005, 2007).  For instance, Maliszewski (2004) 
continued the offensive and criticized Florida’s economic theory for wholly ignoring the 
intensifying problems of urban inequalities and condemned his thesis as an exercise in “yuppie 
self-indulgence,” wherein Florida celebrated “job insecurity” and “uncertainty” as “liberating” 
workers from large corporations, factories, and unions (as cited in Zimmerman, 2008).  Peck 
(2005) stressed that Florida’s creativity script recodifies and even extended the neoliberal 
syllabus that was based on intensifying urban competition, place-marketing, property-led 
development, and gentrification (as cited in Zimmerman, 2008).  Later, Peck (2007) and 






because they have been formulated to exist alongside inequality rather than alleviating it (as cited 
in Culver, 2017).  
Correspondingly, Wilson and Keil (2008) displayed how creative city strategies were 
designed to cater to the desires of an already-privileged, well-educated, and economically better-
off demographic, rather than addressing social inequalities and the needs of the 
socioeconomically marginalized (Culver, 2017).  More critically, other scholars have positioned 
social justice at the core of neoliberal creative city urban development criticism in relation to 
gentrification and social inequalities (Burnett, 2013; Culver 2017; Parekh, 2014; Sims, 2015; 
Smith, 2002).  Scholarly work on social justice is broadly concerned with the question of how 
more equitable geographies can be produced, while recognizing that unjust spaces are socially 
constructed and actively contributes to (re)producing social inequalities in a dialectic relationship 
(Dikec, 2001; Culver, 2017; Harvey, 2009; Soja, 2010).   
Florida (2012) revisited his creative class thesis and addressed the critics whom 
challenged his methods of statistical analyses and determined that his arguments misunderstood 
causality, and were based on circular logic.  Tasked with maintaining his core arguments and 
defending assessments of correlation versus causation, Florida invoked the “chicken versus the 
egg” paradox to assert his emphasis on human capital and creative talent: do people follow jobs, 
or do jobs follow people?  In doing so, Florida continued to argue that building a creative 
community is the panacea for the city’s economic ills (D’andrea, 2013; Florida, 2012).  To be 
sure, Florida is not without his supporters, nor should enhancing the quality of place be a faulty 
virtue.  However, the concerns therein are that: 
Creative place-making illustrates the power of policy discourse, but as a cultural policy 
movement, its projects struggle with engendering revitalization in disadvantaged places, 
supporting artistic development alongside community development, and may be 







Additionally, beyond a few isolated case studies, there is little to no empirical research on the 
community and economic development impacts of creative city place-making (Grodach, 2017).  
In his latest rendition, Florida (2017) struggled to rectify the result of the widespread 
deployment of his creative class theorem by policymakers: gentrification and the widening of 
social inequities resulting from uneven development.  That is to say—there are certainly benefits 
that can be derived from deploying methods to enhance an urban environment designed to attract 
and retain the creative class—albeit the burdens resulting from such practices rests on the 
historically marginalized working-class of the urban poor.  Florida framed his defense in a 
“winner-take-all-urbanism,” one that is both paradoxical and contradictory wherein the interplay 
of innovation and agglomeration gave rise to uneven development, the uneven distribution of 
income and wage inequality, concentrated poverty, and the deepening of residential segregation 
by income and rising housing prices (Beauregard, 2017; Florida, 2017).  In Florida’s words: 
Winner-take-all urbanism means that a few big winners capture a disproportionate share 
of the spoils of innovation and economic growth, while many more places stagnate or fall 
further behind. (Florida, 2017, p. 186) 
 
To this end, Florida remarked on how urban amenities that should benefit all residents—such as 
transportation and urban parks—have become the spoils of the urban elites (Florida, 2017; 
Plummer, 2018).  Central to this observation, Florida highlighted how cultivating a nightlife, 
attracting start-ups and tech firms, and creating transit options without thinking about inclusion 
and equity is what led to inequality (Florida, 2017; Plummer, 2018).  Yet, this is not an argument 
about contradictions or exclusion, but about distribution and how economic and political power 







Prosperity and poverty exist together, with the implication being that prosperity depends 
on deprivation or, to state it bluntly, the rich are rich and creative cities are prosperous 
because other people and other places are exploited and marginalized. (Beauregard, 2017, 
pp. 1028-1029) 
 
It seemed to come as a surprise to Florida that cities can both be diverse and segregated at the 
same time, until he ultimately acknowledged that “knowledge-based places don’t just reflect 
inequality, they help create it” (Florida, 2017, p. 88). 
Yet, through to the end Florida still maintained the core arguments of his creative class 
theory, and continued to suggest that creative cities present both the problem and the solution 
(Florida, 2017).  In a PBS News Hour interview, Florida discussed his influence on urban revival 
and what he characterized as the “crisis of success:” 
A bigger, denser city in general increases the rate of innovation, increases the rate of 
start-up, increases the rate of productivity. At the same time, the bigger, the denser, the 
more knowledge-intensive increases the rate of inequality, increases the rate of economic 
segregation, makes housing less affordable. So, it’s a two-sided monster. So, the second 
dimension is, I kind of call it a crisis of success. These places now become terribly 
unaffordable for anyone who’s not either a knowledge worker or a techie or a member of 
the super-rich. Now owning real estate in a superstar city becomes another class of asset. 
I realized that this urbanism, winner-take-all urbanism, it was benefiting one group much 
more disproportionately than the other two. If the old urban crisis was about the middle-
class flight from the city to the suburbs, the new urban crisis is about really the 
disappearance of middle-class neighborhoods from our society. That’s the great 
contradiction of today’s urbanized capitalism. You know, if we want to have a productive 
city, an innovative city, a country that innovates and creates good jobs, we need them, 
but, at the same time, that the very thing that is driving our economy forward is creating 
these divides. (PBS, 2017) 
 
Finally, in attempt to promote inclusion and alleviate concerns of displacement, gentrification, 
and deepening inequalities within the creative city paradigm, Florida postulated a series of policy 
recommendations geared to solve this “new urban crisis” including place-based initiatives, land-
value taxes, tax increment local transfers, and investments in mass transit (Florida, 2017).  
Seemingly though, not much has changed between the entrepreneurial practices that exacerbated 






Transit-Oriented Development and Implications for Equitable Development 
The evolution of the neoliberal paradigm positioned municipal governments as the 
entrepreneurs of place-based initiatives, and Florida’s (2002, 2003, 2012, 2017) highly 
popularized creative class theory tasked municipalities with rebranding themselves through 
place-making strategies of growth, driven by securing the mobile human capital of creative 
people.  Catalytic transit-oriented development (TOD) projects—such as the modern streetcar—
offered municipalities the promise of rebranding their city to attract the creative class and 
enhance the transportation options of a given locality, while generating economic development 
through sustained private investment.  As a result of these trends, many cities across the United 
States have been investing in mass transit and are now experiencing a resurgence of modern 
streetcar projects that can be understood as a shift towards “strategic spatial planning” (King & 
Fischer, 2016), or more precisely as a “creative city development tool” (Culver, 2017).   
King and Fischer (2016) identified a shift of traditional transportation planning practices, 
and argue that contemporary streetcar projects have been used as a form of strategic spatial 
planning at the expense of integrated transportation planning.  Traditional urban planning efforts 
combine various functions and priorities into a single framework to develop a robust and holistic 
network.  Conversely, strategic spatial planning involves the setting of principles and 
frameworks to guide the location of development.  Modern streetcar projects, for example, vary 
from one city to another with respect to the design characteristics, fare payment systems, and 
owners and operators.  Common among them, however, are the way in which “streetcar 
investments consistently invoke spatial planning and are justified with the expectation of 
increased land value and property development benefits” (King & Fischer, 2016, p. 283).  






planning efforts of city and regional planning agencies is how King and Fischer see modern 
streetcar projects as embodying this strategic spatial planning.   
Culver (2017) developed King and Fischer’s ideas further to argue that the streetcar is not 
just a form of strategic spatial planning, but more precisely a creative city development tool 
intended to attract the affluent millennials of the creative class, and thus embedded in the general 
trajectory of neoliberal urbanization.  Culver’s claims are supported by Brown, Nixon, and 
Ramos (2015).  They find that enthusiasm for streetcars remained high among proponents—
despite poor performance and low-ridership compared to local bus routes operating in the same 
general area—because the streetcar was not seen as primarily a transportation investment, but 
instead as a catalyst to jump-start economic activity, an attraction for young professionals, and a 
symbol of permanent public investment to encourage sustained long-term private investment.  
The authors substantiated their claims through an investigation of five modern-era streetcar 
systems—Portland, Seattle, Little Rock, Memphis, and Tampa Bay—and found that the primary 
purpose of all the streetcar systems was to serve as an economic development tool, with the 
secondary objective to serve as a tourism-promoting amenity, while transportation objectives 
were largely afterthoughts (Brown, et al., 2015).  The study urged local planners and 
policymakers alike to consider the fundamental purpose of any proposed streetcar system in their 
community, and to consider its unintended consequences.  For example, the streetcar systems in 
Little Rock and Memphis were designed to attract tourist-travel markets and experienced lower 
ridership and poor performance due to their vulnerability to economic conditions, compared to 
those that focused on serving a wider array of potential users (Brown, et al., 2015).  
Essentially, contemporary streetcar projects are funded by capital subsidies administered 






Transportation Investment Generating Economic Recovery (TIGER) and Intermodal Surface 
Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) funds—and are predicated on local financial matches 
(Mallet, 2014).  The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) TIGER grant application process 
requires municipalities to submit a cost-benefit analysis of proposed projects.  Through their 
investigation, King and Fischer (2016) found that from 2009-2013, approximately $866 million 
was spent on streetcars (with $279 million, or 32% covered by TIGER grants), and 
approximately 75% of the expected benefits derived from generating economic development.  
Upon consideration of these findings, King and Fischer emphasized that “not only are these 
economic development benefits presented with a degree of certainty, the majority are calculated 
as property value increases which mostly accrue to private owners” (p. 386).  Given the strong 
role of spatial planning and funding coming from both local and federal sources, it is important 
to investigate the major assumptions promoted by the policy framework and to ask whom the 
vision benefits and whom it excludes: 
It is unclear how enhanced property values in select, preferred locations align with 
national transportation priorities related to increasing transit modal split, reducing 
congestion and improving environmental outcomes. (King & Fischer, 2016, p. 387) 
   
Thus, King and Fischer concluded that these projects should be evaluated by the FTA against 
other economic development strategies rather than against other transportation improvements, 
and they set the stage to raise important questions regarding the role of federal transportation 
funding for the benefit of private developers and property owners.  
 Even where municipalities diversify their portfolios, such as the case study of Detroit’s 
Public-Private Streetcar (Lowe & Grengs, 2018), there is still concern for substantial and 
equitable collective benefits when public dollars combine with private funds.  Mirroring the 






investments without the proper mechanisms in place “to ensure collective benefits from projects 
focusing on increased property value, so that collective transportation benefits are not so 
contingent on individual actors” (Lowe & Grengs, 2018, p. 12).  While advocates for such 
projects point to Portland as showcasing the “gold standard” for modern streetcar projects that 
spur TOD with enhanced property values and greater urban livability, critics contend that 
development subsidies and other incentives had a greater impact on property development than 
the streetcar investment itself—which accrue to private owners and raise concerns about the 
equitable distribution of benefits and burdens (Hovee & Gustafson, 2012; King & Fischer, 2016; 
O’Toole, 2012a, 2012b).  Others have argued that without explicit considerations to confront 
social disparities, sustainability initiatives and “green” developments can reproduce racialized 
and spatialized social inequalities, and drive displacement and gentrification (Alkon & 
Agyeman, 2011; Checker, 2011; While, Jonas, & Gibbs, 2004).  Herein explains Portland’s 
“urban sustainability fix” (While et al., 2004) of how the inequitable distribution of green 
investment in the downtown area has led to a more White and affluent urban core, and 
highlighted the uneven development and distribution of opportunity-costs that ultimately 
contributed to the demarcation of racialized poverty along 82nd Avenue of East Portland: 
The sustainability fix is very much a spatial one; as capital returned to inner Portland 
under the banner of sustainability, livability, and neighborhood revitalization, devaluation 
of East Portland’s built environment ensued—even as population increased. (Goodling, 
Green, & McClintock, 2015, p. 516) 
 
Therein privileging economic growth over equity in effort to expand its tax-base, cities are 
tasked with the entrepreneurial efforts to attract affluent, well-educated, environmentally-minded 
residents and the businesses that cater to their tastes.  Under such circumstances:  
Streetcars do little for and may even harm accessibility for transit-dependent populations 
—through bus service changes to accommodate streetcar service and indirectly through 






argue that the project does deliver collective benefits through economic development, but 
the direct economic benefit will be concentrated among property owners ... Instead of 
competition to attract affluent millennials, we argue that public sector officials must 
leverage their roles in public-private deals to ensure more spending that serves transit-
dependent populations by design, not by chance. (Lowe & Grengs, 2018, p. 12) 
 
There is still much debate surrounding the economic development effects of modern streetcar 
projects, although they appear to be major determinants of the decision to build streetcars in most 
cities, regardless of its transportation effects (Brown et al., 2015).   
Furthermore, there is no empirical evidence that modern streetcar systems produce clear 
transportation benefits, nor is there any clear evidence that streetcars attract new users to transit 
(Mallet, 2014).  Economic and political rent-seeking behavior underlie the growth machine 
dynamics and explains why streetcar projects remained appealing to those actors despite the 
mode’s weak transportation performance (Ramos-Santiago, Brown, & Nixon, 2016).  Likewise, 
there is no guarantee that local sustainable development projects and TOD—such as the modern 
streetcar—within existing neighborhoods will encourage or even maintain existing social 
diversity and equity.  Dale and Newman (2009) argued that livability without equity leads to the 
gentrification of the “retailscape,” and a shift towards higher-income residents:  
There may be an inverse relationship: ‘greening’ of neighborhoods can increase 
desirability and thus spur gentrification that drives up housing prices, making those 
developments increasingly less affordable and paradoxically decreases the diversity that 
Florida (2002) claims is so crucial for the creative class. (Dale & Newman, 2009, p. 672)   
 
Even where some degree of accessible housing is mandated as a requirement for development, 
the authors contended that the reality of the housing types and retailscapes offered often do not 
meet the needs of lower-income families. 
Importantly, Brown, et al. (2015) determined from key informant interviews that 
streetcars have taken on a symbolic role separate from its transportation function in many 






intention of generating tourism, attracting visitors, and promoting itself to the creative class.  
Cox (2017) described the role of ideology in growth coalition urban politics as: 
How, that is, the growth coalition fostered and benefited from a discourse that promoted 
the growth of the city and a subsequent national visibility as something that would work 
to the advantage of all, if only at the level of identity. (Cox, 2017, p. 391) 
 
Manville and Cummins (2015) illuminated how ideological discourse created the disparity 
between transit support and actual transit use, identified as a collective action problem.  Their 
findings revealed that public support for transit is grounded in its anticipated social (not private) 
benefits, and showed that transit supporters (predominately White and affluent) and transit users 
(predominately African-American, Latino, and/or low-income) are demographically very 
different people.  The concern with these findings is that: 
Put simply, Americans are more likely to see transit as a way to solve social problems 
than as a way to get around ... Politically, convincing people to finance transit is easier 
than convincing them to ride it, because financing transit requires no change in travel 
behavior. But transit’s benefits hinge on changes in travel behavior—on more people 
riding and fewer people driving. (Manville & Cummins, 2015, p. 331) 
 
This collective action problem stems from the belief that people can benefit from transit without 
riding it, making it unlikely that transit voters will become transit riders.  This is an important 
distinction for the streetcar resurgence era—because streetcar projects are not principally about 
providing transportation solutions—and neither transit supporters nor dependent transit users are 
likely to substitute automobile trips or bus rides for streetcar rides.   
While transit’s ambitions and numerous goals may or may not be poor public policy, 
“they are increasingly not public policy for the poor” (Taylor & Morris, 2015, p. 365).  For 
instance, Culver’s (2017) qualitative content analysis study of 12 streetcar projects in 11 cities—
including Milwaukee’s M-Line/L-Line—found zero references regarding how the projects may 






addition, Culver did not find any considerations for the streetcar’s purported impact on urban 
economic development for the urban poor, nor to how it may function as an improvement to 
local transit:   
In a context wherein the predicted benefits of a streetcar for new transit riders and 
tourists, for attracting new talent and residents, for attracting new and reinvigorating 
existing businesses, and for increasing local property values and the local tax base are all 
essential and consistent arguments, this discursive silence on the topic of social justice is 
deafening (Culver, 2017, p. 27). 
 
Thus, careful consideration and attention to the anticipated benefits and burdens of the 
opportunity-costs of TOD streetcar projects need to be examined and scrutinized for its 
implications for equitable development.   
 
Racial Equity and Evaluating the Benefits and Burdens 
Recently, with recognition to the challenges of growing inequality in urban space 
exacerbated by neoliberal development strategies, governments themselves are starting to 
respond in different ways around these concerns of equity questions.  There is an emerging set of 
literature and practices that offer new methods and toolkits to measure the benefits and burdens 
of racial equity, and to examine ways to address it affirmatively.  Among these are the 
Government Alliance on Race and Equity (GARE) material and the Racial Equity Impact 
Assessment (REIA) from the Race Forward material.   
GARE was launched by the Haas Institute for a Fair and Inclusive Society at the 
University of California Berkeley in 2014, and merged with Race Forward in 2017, under the 
umbrella of the Center for Social Inclusion (Bernabei, 2017).  The GARE and Race Forward 
material present an emerging set of practices and principles around racial equity and 






place-making strategies.  GARE works to advance racial equity and increase opportunities for all 
communities by building the field of practice to advance racial equity within and through 
government, and Race Forward crafts and applies tools and strategies to dismantle structural 
racial inequity and transform policies and practices to create equitable outcomes for all (Nelson, 
Spokane, Ross, & Deng, 2015).  Since 2015, over 157 local and regional governmental 
jurisdictions across the country have joined the ranks of GARE, including Milwaukee County in 
2016 (GARE, 2019).  In 2017, Milwaukee County created the Office on African American 
Affairs to address concerns of race and equity more explicitly throughout the county, and 
advance the practices and principles of the GARE and Race Forward toolkits.   
The GARE Racial Equity Toolkit is guided by a simple set of questions: (1) What is the 
proposal, and desired results and outcomes? (2) What is the data, and what does the data tell us? 
(3) How have communities been engaged, and are there opportunities to expand engagement? (4) 
Who benefits from or will be most burdened by the proposal, and what are the strategies for 
advancing racial equity or mitigating unintended consequences? (5) What is the plan for 
implementation? And, (6) How will accountability be ensured, and how will the results be 
evaluated and communicated? (Curren, Liu, Marsh, & Rose, 2015; Curren, Nelson, Marsh, Noor, 
& Liu, 2016).  Likewise, the Race Forward REIA tool is: 
A systematic examination of how different racial and ethnic groups will likely be affected 
by a proposed action or decision. REIAs are used to minimize unanticipated adverse 
consequences in a variety of contexts, including the analysis of proposed policies, 
institutional practices, programs, plans and budgetary decisions. (Keleher, 2014, p. 29) 
 
Much like environmental impact assessments, the REIA tool is intended to be conducted prior to 
enacting new proposals and inform the decision-making process.  Explicit consideration is 
necessary, because “when racial equity is not consciously addressed, racial inequity is often 







Much of the literature with attention to the recent reemergence of streetcars has mostly 
been limited to more quantifiable issues such as its relation to economic activity and transit-
oriented development, construction and operation costs, impact on property values, congestion 
mitigation, transit efficiency, public health, or value capture (Brown, 2013; Brown et al., 2015; 
Currie, Delbosc, Harrison, & Sarvi, 2013; Currie & Shalaby, 2007; Foletta, Vanderkwaak, & 
Grandy, 2013; Hinners, Nelson, & Buchert, 2018; Mokadi, Mitsova, & Wang, 2013; O’Toole, 
2012a, 2012b; Ramos-Santiago & Brown, 2015; Richmond et al., 2014; Taylor & Morris, 2015; 
Zhao, Iacono, Lari, & Levinson, 2012).  Others have focused on more qualitative issues such as 
place-making, public perception and consensus, cultural politics, racialized space and mobility, 
and transit-induced gentrification (Dorsey & Mulder, 2013; Gibson, 2017; Golub, Marcantonio, 
& Sanchez, 2013; Immergluck & Balan, 2018; Manville & Cummins, 2015).   
Pearsall and Pierce (2010) called upon the need for more theoretical and empirical 
research on the conceptualization of social sustainability and its relationship to environmental 
justice that addresses the distributive and procedural elements of an agenda or policy.  Holifield 
(2001) noted that empirical investigations of environmental justice have typically failed to 
extend investigative analysis beyond sites of chemical hazards and environmental contamination.  
Yet, as illuminated by Holifield, the U.S. DOT, Federal Highway Administration, and the FTA 
consider “environmental justice policy” to be defined as ensuring that minority and low-income 
populations benefit proportionally from transportation projects—including but not limited to 
environmental effects such as aesthetic values, traffic congestion, and air quality, as well as 






Highlighted by Culver (2017), largely missing from the literature (with exceptions to 
Dorsey & Mulder, 2013 and King & Fischer, 2016) have been political and political-economic 
analyses of this major urban development trend, as well as its social implications.  Following 
Culver’s (2017) discussion for future research: 
These projects should be scrutinized as to how the needs of the socioeconomically 
marginalized and captive transit users are addressed by these plans, and whether and to 
what degree the improved livability and economic benefit for some might come at the 
cost of greater exclusion of the urban (mobility) poor. (Culver, 2017, p. 28)   
 
As Culver suggests, mobility analysis should be considered through which social (in)justices are 
produced as a spatial phenomenon.  Considering that mobility is inherently a spatial phenomenon 
(Cresswell, 2010), mobility must also be viewed as one site from and through which social 
(in)justice is produced.   
Mobility measures the ease of moving on the transportation network and the travel time 
index (i.e., the ratio of travel time during congestion/peak-hours to the travel time in uncongested 
conditions), whereas accessibility considers both mobility and the location of activities from 
measuring the ease and efficiency that enables users to reach other people and places within the 
metropolitan area (Levinson & Emilia, 2011).  In short, mobility is about moving people and 
goods from place to place, and accessibility is something that is easily approached, entered, 
obtainable, or attained.  Mobility provides access, but it is not access. Likewise, accessibility 
does not necessarily provide or enhance mobility (Stanley, 2010).  In this sense, accessibility can 
be a valuable indicator for the equitability of TOD projects for a given region or community:   
The choice, and even preference for, one transportation technology over another is driven 
by the desire for mobility and its ability to provide as a means for accessing the goods 
and services we want ... Simply adding transportation modes to an existing built 







More research is thus needed on the active role of TOD projects and its effects on accessibility, 
as well as more generally on government’s co-constitutive role in the production of socially 
(un)just geographies, and its implications for equitable development.   
Duranton and Guerra (2016) argue that accessibility is the main quantity to consider from 
an urban resource allocation standpoint as it links the two primary urban consumption goods: 
land-use and transportation.  
Accessibility is never absolute but always relative and conditional on one’s needs and 
preferences. Consequently, any change in land use patterns or in the transportation 
infrastructure will be positive for some and negative for others. Accessibility is inherently 
a source of conflict. (Duranton & Guerra, 2016, p. 12) 
 
Each urban policy will have multiple direct and indirect effects on accessibility.  While urban 
transportation infrastructure is a congestible public good, the locational choices of commercial 
development, firm location decisions, and household location decisions are subject to 
externalities (Duranton & Guerra, 2016).  There has been little research devoted to the issues of 
equity and accessibility to the transit system in relation to the modern streetcar resurgence, and 
the production of socially just and unjust spaces alike resulting from TOD strategies.  If in fact 
the logic of the modern streetcar project is informed primarily as an economic development tool, 
then the questions become centered around how and where the benefits and burdens of TOD are 
distributed, and how to ensure that TOD projects produce equitable outcomes and improve 
accessibility for those who depend on public transit the most.  More explicitly, to what extent 
does the Milwaukee Streetcar as a TOD project contribute to or detract from the challenges 










The purpose of this research is to investigate the Milwaukee Streetcar (“The Hop”) as a 
creative city TOD tool, and to examine the distribution of benefits and burdens relative to 
distinct constituencies within the City of Milwaukee.  My analysis will be conducted on the 
merits and claims of the streetcar resurgence as a neoliberal creative downtown development 
tool, and will investigate the import of this development strategy relative to racialized poverty 
located elsewhere in the city.  Furthermore, it will include an exploration of what roles the 
municipal government played in advancing the streetcar project with respect to promoting access 
to urban opportunity, mobility/accessibility, and equitable development.  Finally, a comparative 
examination will be made between The Hop’s initial routes (the M-Line, L-Line, and Wisconsin 
Center extension) and the possible extension routes (to Bronzeville and Walker’s Point) that 
deliberately focus on equitable-TOD (e-TOD) outcomes and explicitly consider anti-
displacement strategies for implementation.  This research will seek to shed light on the thinking 
surrounding the streetcar that intersects with the issues of anti-displacement and e-TOD, with a 
focus on whose needs are or are not being met, and how the benefits (and burdens) of the 
Milwaukee Streetcar are distributed.  Concluding remarks will be made concerning the limits of 
this research and recommendations for future research.   
This research will be drawing on qualitative content and discourse analysis2 of newspaper 
articles, public meetings, and policy and planning documents to understand the true dynamics of 
                                                
2 Content analysis is the empirical documentation of quantitative frequencies of terminologies usage for a foundation, and 
discourse analysis builds off the foundation to explore how these meanings and frequencies are used to reinforce or establish 
meanings.  Discourse is the guiding principle for policy and planning documents to frame its vision, goals, measurable objectives, 
recommendations, and outcomes.  Discourse analysis is used to understand how the deployment of language has social content 
and societal effects, to identify discursive focus and discursive silence, and language difference between policy documents, 
public opinion and media coverage (Hastings, 2000).  “Arguably, much of the ultimate value of discourse analysis rests in its 
capacity to be used as a critical tool for unearthing and, in the process challenging, deeply embedded assumptions and received 
knowledge” (Hastings, 2000, p. 138).  Discourse analysis could also shed light on contradictory elements between documents and 
policy in action.  Intertextuality works across different texts to identify the dominant discourse that helped stabilize common-






the benefits and burdens of the streetcar as a TOD strategy and its impacts in Milwaukee.  To 
supplement my analytical perspective, this inquiry will also be based on five conducted semi-
structured interviews of relevant stakeholders, including city staff, elected officials, development 
consultants, and community representatives of neighborhood and business organizations 
(Interview questions can be found the Appendix).  For this study, interviewee identities will be 
kept confidential and quoted responses will be cited by a random number and the interviewer 
initials (e.g., 25JD) to ensure anonymity of the participants. Guided by the REIA and GARE 
material, this research will also be applying an equity lens to strategically question and analyze 
the distribution of the benefits and burdens between different groups and stakeholders.  The use 
of multiple qualitative data sources allowed for the triangulation of data to be examined with an 
analytical perspective of an equity lens. 
 
CASE STUDY OF MILWAUKEE 
Milwaukee’s Creative City Development Strategies 
Zimmerman (2008) made the case that Milwaukee’s growth coalition adopted Florida’s 
creative class theory of urban growth in the early 2000’s, and influenced policymakers to 
envision a creative city development template that established a new wave of planning that was 
“rooted squarely in a fortified regime of place marketing, property-led development, 
gentrification and normalized sociospatial inequality” (p. 231).  Derived from a detailed 
investigation of planning documents and extensive interviews with Milwaukee stakeholders and 
land-based interest groups, Zimmerman’s research demonstrated how Florida’s ideas were 
assimilated into the infrastructure of Milwaukee’s urban promotion, and argued: 
Milwaukee represents a strategic incubator site for the articulation of innovative 






Milwaukee are essentially experiments emerging within the broader neoliberal syllabus, 
which, among other things, dictates that urban space be mobilized as an arena for market-
oriented economic growth and elite consumption. (Zimmerman, 2008, p. 231) 
 
Among the first efforts of growth coalition activities was to rebrand Milwaukee’s image from 
“brew town to cool town” following Florida’s extensive tour of the city when he declared, “This 
is cool, this is really cool” (Gertzen, 2001, as cited in Zimmerman, 2008), and recommended that 
the city highlight and promote its “coolness components” of place (Cigallio-Granger, 2003, as 
cited in Zimmerman, 2008).  
The Metropolitan Milwaukee Association of Commerce (MMAC)—one of the city’s 
most influential business coalitions—brought Richard Florida to Milwaukee for a series of visits 
beginning in 1999, which began his influential imprint on the Milwaukee business and 
development community, and received considerable positive attention from the press (Sherman, 
2015).  Following his visit, the MMAC—along with the help from the OnMilwaukee news 
publication—created a social network organization called the Young Professionals of Milwaukee 
(YPM) to spark the creative class conversations in the greater metropolitan Milwaukee area, and 
rebrand the city’s image (Sherman, 2015; Zimmerman, 2008).  YPM (now known as Fuel 
Milwaukee) also encouraged the spawning of other Florida-inspired organizations, such as 
Newaukee and the Creative Alliance (Sherman, 2015).  Between 1995 and 2005, Milwaukee’s 
official promotional logo was represented by an industrial gear-like symbol reminiscent of the 
industrial past, accompanied with the slogan “Milwaukee, the Genuine American City” 
(Zimmerman, 2008, p. 233).  Milwaukee’s rebranding efforts were not materialized until another 
alliance of downtown business groups—the Spirit of Milwaukee (SOM)—conducted a study and 
found that most Americans associated Milwaukee with “beer” and “cold,” and thus began their 






of Milwaukee—moving towards cool without screaming cool” (Zimmerman, 2008, p. 234).  
Milwaukee’s new logo that launched in 2005 became a representation of the Calatrava-designed 
addition of the Milwaukee Art Museum (MAM) that SOM determined to not only have stunning 
visual images, but also produced the strongest identity of place (Zimmerman, 2008).   
The Calatrava symbol worked on many fronts.  Named after the internationally renowned 
“starchitect” Santiago Calatrava, the new addition to the MAM elevated Milwaukee to an 
international stage of recognition, generated measurable increases in tourism, and was 
instrumental in producing a high-rise residential real estate boom in the surrounding area 
(Murphy, 2003, as cited in Zimmerman, 2008).  The $122 million addition of the MAM was also 
representative of the entrepreneurial city’s strategy of “speculative development of place” 
(Harvey, 1989, p. 8), wherein the MAM: 
Became an apt symbol of recent growth-coalition activity in Milwaukee, in that it 
mobilized both private and public funds to support selective economic growth and elite 
consumption practices, while at the same time successfully merging the ‘creativity script’ 
with the symbolic economy of the city’s downtown neighborhoods. (Zimmerman, 2008, 
p. 236) 
 
Prior to the completion of the MAM expansion, Milwaukee had initiated a series of catalytic 
projects that sought to humanize its streetscapes with mixed-use and pedestrian-friendly 
redevelopment projects, and reestablish connections between downtown neighborhoods and the 
riverfront.  
Milwaukee’s 1999 comprehensive downtown plan was envisioned with a New Urbanist 
ideal that began to shift the city away from the modern automobile-centric and mono-functional 
zoning planning, and initiated a series of catalytic redevelopment projects that would help craft 
more pedestrian-friendly neighborhoods.  Spearheaded by Mayor John Norquist (1988-2004)—






70% of streetscapes within the downtown area were unwelcoming to pedestrian use, and called 
for the elimination of one-way streets and the conversion of vacant land, surface lots, and 
brownfield sites into mixed-use pedestrian-friendly neighborhoods, each with their own distinct 
identity (Zimmerman, 2008).  The plan’s rhetoric represented a confluence of: 
The discourse of ‘traditional’ cultural values, the ascendant planning discourse of New 
Urbanism, and dominance of neo-liberalism in the arena of public policy converge in 
Milwaukee’s image-making and development strategies. (Kenny & Zimmerman, 2004) 
 
As highlighted by Kenny and Zimmermn (2004), New Urbanist design principles and neo-
traditional values are not necessarily linked inherently, but were conflated into a neoliberal 
discourse that favors “individual responsibility over government subsidies and emphasizes 
private-sector solutions for issues ranging from affordable housing to education” (p. 75).  In 
doing so, Mayor Norquist and the Congress for the New Urbanism championed civic 
entrepreneurialism, and attributed uneven development and the flight of jobs and capital as the 
result of an overbearing federal government (Kenny & Zimmerman, 2004). 
Two of the largest redevelopment projects that resulted from the plan was the demolition 
of the Park East freeway—located along a strip of prime real estate that also represented a 
symbolic barrier between the downtown and the slowly gentrifying neighborhoods to the north—
and the development of a mixed-use neighborhood built along a brownfield riverfront corridor in 
the Beerline district: 
Beerline redevelopment efforts paid special attention to opening up the formerly-
inaccessible riverfront property, and re-establishing connections to the adjacent 
neighborhoods. The downtown Riverwalk was extended along the entire waterfront 
portion of the corridor, fashioning one of Milwaukee’s most unique semi-public spaces. 
Pedestrian access to the neighborhoods above the bluff was provided by a series of 
prominent outdoor staircases as well. Highlighting the emphasis on outdoor recreation 
and the reclamation of the river for use by the creative class, the Milwaukee Row Club 
was invited to make its home in a prominent location in the heart of the new 







Within the following few years, roughly 3000 new residential units were constructed in the 
central business district with an average of 500 new units per year, and property owners 
registered a 54% increase of property values (Gertzen & Daykin, 2003, Gould, 2002, as cited in 
Zimmerman, 2008).  Figure 1 shows the marriage between redevelopment zones in Milwaukee 
and the creation of new residential units, exemplified as property-led development. 
Later, Milwaukee’s subsequent plan entitled “live/work/play” envisioned an even more 
explicitly creative city development template, again showcasing how Florida’s visits inspired 
municipal actors.  The authors of the plan worked in popular motifs of the “creativity-driven 
economy” and encouraged certain companies of the manufacturing sector to rebrand themselves 
and resurface as tech companies (Kahler-Slater, 2002, as cited in Zimmerman, 2008).  The plan 
also stressed the importance of attracting and securing the young professionals of the creative 
class in a competitive global market of cities, and recommended the integration of Milwaukee’s 
new logo into the material landscape of the city with “bright, colorful, and fun signs” at the 
airport and along freeways and city streets—and even went so far as to recommend that local 
media outlets report more positive stories about Milwaukee, and showcase successful 
neighborhoods and industries to cast the city’s image to be more attractive to residents 
surrounding the greater metro area (Kahler-Slater, 2002, as cited in Zimmerman, 2008).  While 
rebranding a city’s image and attempting to attract young professionals into the local economy 
are not troublesome on the surface, Zimmerman’s concerns were that: 
Celebrations of the creative class by the Milwaukee growth coalition had the overall 
effect of repackaging gentrification and making it politically digestible to local planners 
and municipal actors desperate for simple solutions to complex problems. (p. 240) 
 
To be clear, the ambitions of the creative city development template are not necessarily rooted in 
















and cultural diversity, active lifestyles, and vibrant neighborhoods are all noble and virtuous 
ambitions.  However, the effects of these (re)development strategies and the (re)distributions of 
the benefits and burdens across a community or municipality that is alarming and needs to be 
reckoned with by planners and policymakers alike.   
Zimmerman showed how this “repackaging of gentrification” was underscored by the 
Milwaukee City Council’s vote to reject a $41 million public subsidy to redevelop the former 
Pabst Brewery Complex into a new upscale downtown neighborhood, and the following 
onslaught that ensued from the growth coalition and its media arms.  Policy-makers responded 
by publically blaming the city’s presumed culture of working-class conservatism: 
Do enough people understand that Milwaukee will have to shed its working class heritage 
if it is to join the ranks of America’s great cities? The City Council vote to reject the 
PabstCity project suggests there is still much work to be done on this front. It was 
instructive to learn how relatively easy it was to kill the project. Defending the status quo 
will always be easier than championing for change. (Lightbourn, 2005, p. 20, as cited by 
Zimmerman, 2008, p. 240).  
 
These discursive moves demonstrate how the Milwaukee growth coalition developed a pro-
gentrification narrative that essentially validated one comparatively small and privileged class of 
consumers, and normalized socio-spatial inequalities buttressed by overlapping regimes of 
exclusion, while making nearly invisible representations of the broader population of the city’s 
African-American, Latino, and working-poor populations (Zimmerman, 2008).  For example, 
from 2001-2005, Milwaukee’s economic development portfolio exceeded $412 million—71% 
invested in real estate and other physical improvements, 22% used to attract, retain or expand 
jobs within the city, and only 1% invested in workforce development and training—with 
approximately $300 million in public subsidies directed for the professional classes 
(Zimmerman, 2008).  To further illustrate the case of inequities, in 2006, the local parks district 






budget shortfalls (Umhoefer, 2006, as cited in Zimmerman, 2008).  Yet, the same agency was 
robust enough to dedicate $200,000 for a public art installation in an upscale corridor of the 
downtown area, thereby substituting the quality of life in many of the city’s poorest 
neighborhoods for a creative-cultural expression in the public spaces of Milwaukee’s central area 
(Schumacher, 2005, as cited by Zimmerman, 2008).  To complicate things further, between 1999 
and 2003, almost 50,000 jobs were lost (White, 2004, as cited in Zimmerman, 2008), and 60% of 
working African-American males were jobless between 2002 and 2004 (Levine, 2004, as cited in 
Zimmerman, 2008).  These factors are what allowed Zimmerman to connect Milwaukee’s 
development strategies with gentrification: 
Gentrification supported directly by the local growth coalition similarly produced a 
widening zone of intensifying rents, which displaced hundreds of centrally-located 
manufacturing jobs from the Third Ward and Walker’s Point neighborhoods. In other 
neighborhoods where the actions of the local growth coalition were especially intense, an 
exclusive professional-class monoculture emerged. This was particularly true in the 
riverfront Beerline redevelopment area and in immediately adjacent neighborhoods such 
as Brewer’s Hill, where the conversion of rental duplexes to single-family homes worked 
to progressively purge the working-class African-American population from what was 
once one the city’s most diverse neighborhoods. (Zimmerman, 2008, p. 241) 
 
In short, Milwaukee’s redevelopment strategies throughout the course of the early 2000’s were 
inspired by Florida’s creative class theory, and guided by Milwaukee’s ambitions to assert itself 
on a national and international stage as a “cool and hip” destination for young professionals to 
relocate and settle, but also harbored unintended consequences of widening the gap of social 
inequities with uneven development.   
 In 2010, Milwaukee’s Citywide Policy Plan (a revision of the 1999 plan) continued to 
invoke the rhetoric of creative city economic development strategies.  Highlighted among them 
include opportunities for the city’s ability to attract talent:  
Successful employers rely not only on home-grown talent, but also work hard to attract 






their skills and experience to Milwaukee are a significant economic asset, and it is thus 
appropriate to focus on attracting a more educated population. Milwaukee’s image was 
long considered a barrier to the attraction of job applicants from other parts of the 
country, but that is changing. Strategic investments like the recent redevelopment of 
Milwaukee’s downtown and riverfront neighborhoods have helped to increase the city’s 
appeal to a young, educated, mobile population. (DCD, 2010, p. 98) 
 
Policies to attract talent to Milwaukee from elsewhere included: investing in quality of life 
measures; investing in public transportation assets; promoting Milwaukee’s assets to regional 
and national audiences; supporting activities of FUEL Milwaukee; and positioning Milwaukee as 
a “green city” that supports environmental sustainability (DCD, 2010).  The plan also recognized 
that the downtown continues to evolve as a highly-attractive destination—attributed from recent 
development activity in the residential sector near the Milwaukee River, Historic Third Ward, 
and downtown—and called for exploring opportunities available for continued downtown 
development, including improvements at the lakefront, and the creation of a streetcar line. 
 
Historical Context of the Milwaukee Streetcar 
The historical context—including the coalition building across scales and sectors, and the 
political battles and struggles that ensued—all played an important role in why, how, when, and 
where the Milwaukee Streetcar became the priority for implementation.  As one interviewee 
responded:  
That question requires a 30-year understanding of the history of the funding that was used 
for the streetcar, and the fact that it wasn’t initially the priority. The priority was to build 
a high-speed rail system that would have connected the City of Milwaukee to our western 
suburbs, and the funding was allocated from the federal government to do just that. We 
had the funding to do that, and obviously, our suburban municipalities have done 
everything they can do to stop that and put up barriers every step of the way—there’s 
been barriers that have been put up by a number of people from different political levels 
going back to the early 90s to stop any kind of a more extensive regional transportation 
options that would connect the city to the suburbs. The city’s priority in 1992 was to 
build a more robust system, but then funds were peeled off for other things. (31JD) 






In 1991, Congress passed the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) and 
opened a pool of $155 billion in federal funds.  ISTEA was a significant benchmark in 
transportation policy in several ways.  First, it was envisioned as landmark legislation that would 
propel the United States into a post-interstate era through an emphasis on intermodal systems, 
linking highway, rail, air, and marine transportation.  Second, it called for the designation of five 
high-speed rail corridors, including a Midwest corridor linking Milwaukee to Chicago, St. Louis 
and Detroit.  Third, the act reorganized the Federal-aid highway program and established the 
National Highway System and the Interstate Maintenance Program, thereby limiting activities 
authorized for funding to include:  
The reconstruction of bridges, interchanges, and over crossings along existing interstate 
routes, including the acquisition of right-of-way where necessary, but shall not include 
the construction of new travel lanes other than high occupancy vehicle lanes or auxiliary 
lanes. (Weingroff, 2017)   
 
In addition, ISTEA continued discretionary and formula funds for mass transit, and state and 
local governments were given more flexibility in determining transportation solutions with the 
creation of the Surface Transportation Program, and its subprogram the Transportation 
Enhancement Program, which was designed to increase public participation and enhance the 
collaboration of transportation stakeholders (Schweppe, 2001).  In summary, ISTEA has 
transformed the transportation planning and development process by allowing state and local 
governments greater autonomy of how to allocate federal dollars for regional and local projects, 
and by increasing opportunities for collaboration and giving stakeholders a stronger voice 
(Schweppe, 2001).  
From the aftermath of ISTEA, Milwaukee was awarded $289 million for the use of 
public transit projects in 1991.  In the late 1990s, the Wisconsin DOT approved a plan put 






system and expanding bus service to Waukesha County (Schmitt, 2012).  However, officials 
debated and rejected plans for a full-scale light-rail system, a bus-only highway, a guided electric 
bus system, and reserved bus and carpool lanes along the I-94 corridor, which ultimately led the 
federal government to withdraw $48 million because of the local and state officials’ inability to 
decide where, when, and how to spend the funds (Sandler, 2009).  It was reported in the 
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel that Wauwatosa’s State Representative Scott Walker (1993-2002) 
“was among the suburban Republicans who helped kill that plan, persuading fellow Republican 
Thompson to rule out any state or federal money to study light rail” (Sandler, 2011a).   
In 1999, a deal between County Executive Tom Ament (1992-2002), Mayor John 
Norquist (1988-2004), and Governor Tommy Thompson (1987-2001)—with the approval of the 
federal government—diverted $149.5 million of the remaining $241 million to a series of 
projects that included the construction of the new Marquette Interchange, 6th Street Viaduct 
bridges, Canal Street redevelopment, Lakeshore State Park walkway, and the demolition of the 
Park East Freeway (Jannene, 2009; Sandler, 2011b).  The last part of the deal set aside $91.5 
million for a public transit project that would connect downtown to its surrounding 
neighborhoods, and Walker attacked that portion of the agreement, expressing that he would 
rather lose all the $241 million than see any of it spent on light-rail.  Another interviewee 
explained: 
The downtown streetcar has a long and complicated history. I might not be the best 
person that has the whole history, but I know it did originate from a lawsuit. The funds 
became available as a result from a lawsuit and then had to be used for a rail system. So, 
that’s kind of the short story of why there was a streetcar, but I think the city has always 
envisioned having a fixed-rail option within the city. (55JD) 
 
The lawsuit came from a civil rights complaint filed against the state through the U.S. DOT—






Alderman (2004-present)—which ruled in the city’s favor in 2000 (Schmitt, 2012).  The case 
was won under Title VI, arguing that many of Milwaukee’s African-American residents didn’t 
have cars while nearly all white suburbanites did, and that there was a discriminatory impact 
against minorities by favoring freeways over public transit (Sandler, 2011a; Schmitt, 2012).  
Throughout the following decade, the remaining $91.5 million in federal funds was 
debated and fought over leading up to the 2010 gubernatorial election between County Executive 
Scott Walker (2002-2010) and Mayor Tom Barrett (2004-Present).  In 2009, Senator Herb Kohl 
and Representative David Obey introduced a bill that became known as the Omnibus 
Appropriations Act of 2009, which subsequently divided the $91.5 million in a 60/40 split 
between the City of Milwaukee ($54.9 million) and Milwaukee County ($36.6 million), allowing 
each branch to pursue their respective projects (Jannene, 2009).  The county used their $36.6 
million share, supplemented by an additional $9.1 million in federal funding and $6.5 million 
matched by the county, for the purchase of 136 new buses for Milwaukee County (Sandler, 
2011b).  The city used their portion of the funds to pursue the hotly debated streetcar project: 
It has probably been the most controversial project around City Hall in the last decade. I 
mean, is it even close? Not for city-controlled municipal projects. I mean, obviously, 
there are other things going on. Well, maybe the police stuff—maybe the issues of police 
shootings—but even that probably generates less phone calls. If you’re talking things that 
generates phone calls to our office, and media stories, it’s really the streetcar, and then 
everything else. (25JD)  
 
There was also a separate pot of funds that was made available for Wisconsin that is important 
for the context of the streetcar, and became the central issue of debate between Walker and 









High-Speed Rail and the Race for Governor 
In 2009, President Obama announced his vision for the High-Speed Intercity Passenger 
Rail program, a 21st Century “New Deal” that would revolutionize travel in the United States 
(Figure 2).  President Obama called for a collaborative effort by all branches of the government 
and other key stakeholders to help transform America’s transportation network.  Wisconsin 
Governor Jim Doyle (2003-2011) and Mayor Barrett answered that call and joined forces to 
recruit a train manufacturer to Milwaukee and begin preliminary work.  In 2010, Wisconsin was 
awarded $810 million in federal stimulus money from the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act to build a high-speed rail from Milwaukee to Madison, and had expansion plans that would 
eventually extend to Minneapolis.  
In August 2009, Governor Doyle announced that he will not be seeking reelection for a 
third term, more than anything else, due to ethical reasons and his belief that office should only 
be held for 8 years, regardless if the state permits it (WMTV, 2009).  President Obama released a 
statement praising Governor Doyle, and after the announcement, several rumors began to 
circulate that the governor might be asked to join the ranks of the Obama Administration given 
their previous collaborations (CBS News, 2010).  Even though Governor Doyle was out of the 
2010 gubernatorial race, President Obama’s visit to Wisconsin and endorsement of Mayor 
Barrett seemed to align all the pieces for a Barrett victory and the implementation of the high- 
speed rail (Losh, 2010).  Republican candidate for Governor Scott Walker, however, had a 
different vision and rallied to protest President Obama, Governor Doyle, and Mayor Barrett’s 
plans to build a high-speed rail system in Wisconsin, demonstrating his distaste on how 
















Right out of the gates, Walker publically opposed the spending of federal money and 
made it the centerpiece of his campaign: labeling it as a “boondoggle,” a waste of taxpayer 
money, and reckless government spending (Schultze, 2009).  After President Obama’s visit, 
Walker continued the barrage of attacks and insisted that the money would be better spent by 
investing in Wisconsin’s crumbling roads and bridges.  In response, U.S. DOT Secretary Ray 
LaHood wrote to Walker to be clear on how the federal funds may be used: 
I respect the power of governors to make decisions for their states. There seems to be 
some confusion, however, about how these high-speed rail dollars can be spent. For this 
reason, I would like to set the record straight: None of the money provided to Wisconsin 
may be used for road or highway projects, or anything other than high-speed rail. (Smith, 
2010) 
 
As insurance, Governor Doyle and Wisconsin Legislature’s Joint Finance Committee moved 
ahead to approve the spending of federal stimulus money to be included in the 2009-2011 budget 
bill, as well as inserted legislative roadblocks which would require another bill passed to remove 
the funds from the budget (Stein & Marley, 2010). 
 The gubernatorial election was held on November 2, 2010, and with a 52.2% to 46.5% 
margin, Governor-Elect Scott Walker celebrated his inauguration and vowed to keep his promise 
of putting an end to the high-speed rail project in Wisconsin.  Despite long-term planning and 
bipartisan support, on December 9, 2010, Secretary LaHood announced the DOT were 
withdrawing and redirecting the funds allocated to Wisconsin due to Governor Walker’s 
commitment to derail the project (U.S. DOT, 2010).  As one interviewee described the 
opposition for the streetcar: 
One strain of opposition was the totally car-centric libertarian/republican argument which 
was just any form of transportation subsidy—except for the massive freeway and road 
subsidies (anything but those!)—is communism: ‘No God-fearing American taxpayer 
should have to pay for somebody else to ride a train.’ They can pay for somebody else to 
have a smooth ride in their car, but don’t let them be on the train because that’s 






opposition against the heavy-rail, and it worked. You can’t say he was sneaky about it. 
He said: ‘This train is a waste of money,’ and 52% of Wisconsin agreed with him. He got 
elected Governor three times, lost the fourth time, but that first election is what killed 
heavy-rail. It seemed to galvanize this idea that any spending on public transportation is a 
waste of money. (25JD) 
 
As several interviewees pointed out, it is important to note that the Milwaukee Streetcar was 
intended to be one piece of a larger package of transportation technologies: heavy-rail, 
commuter-rail, light-rail, and buses.  And all four technologies need to be integrated and work 
together to have an effective system: 
The heavy-rail would be Chicago-Milwaukee-Madison-Minneapolis, and then 
Milwaukee-Green Bay/Appleton. Commuter-rail would be Milwaukee-Racine-Kenosha, 
Milwaukee-Waukesha, and Milwaukee-Mequon. And then the light-rail would be what 
the streetcar is. So ultimately, the only way the streetcar will be successful is if you 
ultimately get all four phases with strong revenue stream and expansion, and all four need 
to work together. (25JD) 
 
Another interviewee explained: 
During this time, when some of these decisions were being made it seemed like we were 
on the path for having high-speed rail from Madison to Milwaukee that would have 
terminated at the Intermodal Station and the Streetcar would have been a great 
complement to that. So, that was another thing that was stopped by the Republican 
leaders in Madison. And at the same time, they were also passing laws that prevented 
Regional Transit Authorities. It’s one thing to be able to step back and look at it from a 
purely academic standpoint ... and then it’s another thing to have to operate in the 
political context we’re operating in—a lot of those things have huge obstacles of 
feasibility because of the people who are setting some of the rules we have to operate 
in—and that’s a real challenge. (31JD) 
  
To Stone (1989,1993, 2005), regime behavior is not habitual, but rather purposeful, and 
purpose is central to the rise and fall of urban regimes.  Purpose motivates engagement, 
engagement mobilizes resources, and mobilized resources provide problem-solving or purpose-
advancing capacities.  Thus, it is purpose engagement, and capacity which are central to forming, 
sustaining, and altering regime arrangements.  Furthermore, problems are not self-defining—






becomes central—it reflects and is constrained by context, but also has the capacity to alter that 
context and reshape an agenda.  The political discourse in which cities are represented, then, 
becomes some form of self-fulfilling prophecy.  Reichl (1999) develops an analytical framework 
that highlights political discourse in the process of forging political coalitions that depend on a 
shared vision that defines and justifies an urban policy agenda:  
Urban regimes are constructed not only around direct material interests and trade-offs, 
but also around a shared discourse that defines and justifies to a particular urban 
agenda ... material interests shape the language of politics, and political discourse shapes 
the pursuit of material interests. (Reichl, 1999, pp. 15-16) 
 
The coalition that formed around the Obama Administration, former Governor Doyle, and Mayor 
Barrett (among others) was indeed forged around the shared vision of transforming American 
cities with high-speed passenger rail intended to generate economic activity following the 2008 
Great Recession, and address environmental and climate change concerns.  While it may have 
been noble in principle, Barrett’s campaign failed to invoke symbolic imagery to advance their 
agenda.  Walker’s campaign, on the other hand, was founded on the rhetoric of the neoliberal 
prescript—austerity, deregulation, downsizing government, lowering taxes, and positioning 
government as the enemy of economic freedom, prosperity and wealth.  
 Not only did Governor Walker continue to create barriers for expanding public transit 
infrastructure in the state legislature since taking office with more budget cuts, but he also 
contributed to the budget crisis of the Milwaukee County Transit System (MCTS) while serving 
as County Executive.  One interviewee indicated that the most important transportation issue in 
Milwaukee is dedicated funding: 
Our bus system is starving. I’ve always been a proponent supporter of our bus system, 
and they’re starting to feel the effects now where it’s starting to hurt. I’m a regular transit 
rider and I’m getting on bus lines where the frequency is once every half-hour. That’s 
unacceptable. MCTS is doing the best they can with the resources we have, but we need 






some point down the line. That’s the most singular important issue. Dedicated funding. 
(41JD) 
 
As another participant explained: 
Right now, the buses are on a death spiral of funding. It started with under County 
Executive Scott Walker when he started spending capital money on operating. He 
basically did something that worked for 5 years and then when he got elected Governor, 
all that capital money he’d been spending on operating ran out and there were massive 
service cuts to the bus system, and as Governor gave even less money to the buses. This 
is what I call the ‘death spiral’ where legislatives, for whatever reason, provide less 
money for the bus system, which has always relied mainly on county, state, and federal 
money for revenue streams. We need this taxpayer dollar money. Once you decide to cut 
that, then you have to cut service. You cut service, and then less people want to ride it 
because it becomes more inconvenient. When head-wastes go up, ridership goes down, 
except for people who have no other choice. But people who do have a choice, begin to 
choose not to ride the bus if it becomes too inconvenient and it doesn’t come often 
enough or go to enough places, or you have to transfer too many times. So, then less 
people ride it, there’s less people to complain to politicians about the funding cuts, and 
then they cut even more—that’s the situation we’re in now. It’s not a definite death spiral 
because we have federal grants that could help and we have a county government that has 
disagreements about the bus system, but isn’t anti-bus. But we did for 8 years have a state 
government that was anti-bus, and that has consequences for funding. (25JD) 
 
The interviewee went on to suggest that instead of being in competition with MCTS, that the 
streetcar could save the buses if it meant it gets more people out of their cars, and the two 
systems are integrated with one another.  In the next section, the streetcar starter lines will be 
explored in greater detail.  
 
Milwaukee Streetcar: M-Line/L-Line 
After nearly 30 years of political debate and over 40 Common Council meetings, 
Milwaukee’s Streetcar (“The Hop”) was granted approval of its proposed 2009 route in 2015—
albeit with minor modifications to avoid major utility intersections—and began operation of its 
2.1-mile downtown loop (“M-Line”) in November of 2018 (Figure 3).  The M-Line connects 














the Lower East Side.  Demographics of the respective neighborhoods directly served by the 
streetcar are in stark contrast to Milwaukee’s general composition, and the demographics of 
neighborhoods not immediately served by the streetcar.  While Milwaukee’s general 
demographic composition breaks down to 38.2% African-American, 35.5% White, and 18.7% 
Latino, the Historic Third Ward harbors a population of 84.9% White (8.16% African-American, 
2.86% Latino) and surveyed 69.5% of residents using automobiles as their means of 
transportation to work, with only 5.46% surveyed as public transportation users (City-Data, 
2016).  Likewise, the Lower Eastside houses a population of 80.2% White (8.6% African-
American, 4.35% Latino), wherein 66.2% drove a car to work and only 7.26% surveyed as 
public transportation users (City-Data, 2016).   
With intentions to garner new transit users, the City of Milwaukee—made possible with 
its $10 million partnership with Potawatomi Hotel & Casino over the next 12 years to help cover 
operation costs—will provide free rides for a year ($1 per trip following).  A federal Congestion 
Mitigation Air Quality grant of $3.18 million awarded in 2014, will also contribute to cover 80% 
of the operating costs through the first 18 months (Reid, 2014).  Sponsorships and advertising 
during the first three years will cover the operational costs not covered by the grant, and beyond 
that will be funded through a combination of fare box revenue, federal funding opportunities,  
operating agreements with partners, and additional sponsorships and advertising (Hess, 2018).  
The 0.4-mile lakefront extension route (“L-Line”)—the system’s second phase—was made 
possible by a $14.2 million federal TIGER grant awarded in 2015, and is expected to begin 
operation in 2020 (Barrett, 2015).  Outside of the Potawatomi Hotel & Casino partnership, 
federal funding from the ISTEA and TIGER grants, and other corporate sponsorships, the 






Financing (TIF) districts (Figure 4)—$9.7 million from the Cathedral Place TID #49, $18.3 
million from the Erie/Jefferson Riverwalk TID #56, and $31 million from the East Michigan 
Street TID #82 (Jannene, 2015).  The only TIF district that would directly intersect with a 
streetcar route will be TID #82 with the L-Line extension route (Osmulski, 2019).   
The first phase routing alignment was chosen for several reasons.  First, as mentioned 
above, part of the stipulation with the federal grant required the streetcar to connect with the 
heavy-rail Intermodal Station.  Second, as one interviewee explained: 
Some of the routing towards the end [of the planning process] was impacted by utility 
costs, which was a major thing—and again, that’s another way that a political battle 
certainly impacts real-life of what happens on the ground when the State Public Service 
Commission changed the rules around who would be responsible for the payment out of 
any utility work that would happen as a result of the streetcar, and shifted the costs from 
the utility provider—which is how it is done in every other transportation project in the 
state—to the local municipality, and that had impacts on the routing decision. (31JD) 
 
Third, within its quarter-mile walkshed, the route is in proximity to reach 100% of the area’s 
hotels, 91% of the area’s occupied street-level retail space, 90% of the area’s office space, 77% 
of the area’s housing, and it connects with 13% of the city’s tax-base (Figure 5) despite being 
only within a quarter-mile of 2% of the city’s land area (Jannene, 2011).  Furthermore, there was 
also a rationale that this alignment would generate more tourism activity and attract new users to 
public transit.  As one interviewee indicated: 
My biggest concern is that we need to think about our transit network as a network and a 
system, and we don’t do that. We think of it as these one-off shiny projects. To be frank, 
the streetcar was the flavor of the day. Every other city in the country was either looking 
at it or doing it. I think it was sold as this thing like: ‘this is how you get millennials to 
move downtown.’ I think it is an amenity, but it should be part of a bigger package in a 
bigger system and network. I also struggled greatly with the fact that spending so much 
money in one small component of our system that doesn’t really elevate the rest of the 
network, and really only serves a very certain segment—generally the wealthier, Whiter 
segment of our community—when most of the regular transit users in our community are 























There is also a potential for creating two very separate worlds in transit when such a short route 
is catered to attract “choice-riders,” as another interviewee cautioned: 
I think there are multiple reasons for the focus on ‘choice-riders.’ One is, I think there is 
this idea that we always want to increase ridership and increase revenue, and the only 
way to do that is by convincing people to use the transit system. I mean, the people who 
don’t have access to cars and don’t have other options are already taking the transit 
system, so there is this push to serve ... but then I think there is also this sort of critique of 
municipalities that we want to serve choice-riders because in some ways [streetcars] are 
viewed more attractive. Like, the idea of ‘how do we get young professionals to use 
transit?’ Well, we have to give them fancy vehicles and Wi-Fi and all that stuff. Which, it 
might be true, but I worry that there are certain times that certain decisions can be made 
through that lens, and the interests between those population groups are not always 
equal—and if there’s ever a time when those interests are in conflict, then you choose to 
do things that are going to benefit people who are called choice-riders—and it can 
potentially have equity impacts and negative impacts on people who are transit-
dependent. (31JD) 
 
Another interviewee expressed this as:  
I think there is a potiential danger there if the different units of government can’t get their 
act together and cooperate. And so, there’s a danger if we don’t integrate them well 
[MCTS and the streetcar] you would create a ‘yuppie train’ and a poor-person’s bus. 
(25JD) 
   
On this front, a recent report shows that 60% of MCTS riders have an annual household income 
of less than $36,000, and 45% of riders use the bus as their primary means to get to work (CEDS, 
2015).  Alderman Bauman—who filed the civil rights case against the state for discriminatory 
impact with the allocation of the high-speed rail funds—even publically admitted “two miles of 
light rail doesn’t benefit minority communities, we readily acknowledge that now ... we’re 
looking at this as an economic development tool” (Schmitt, 2012).  Former Alderman Joe Davis 
was also vocal about what benefits it would bring to the African-American community and 
“black millennials,” condemning Mayor Barrett that he only cares about “white millennials” for 






In fact, the city has been forthcoming on labeling the streetcar as an economic 
development tool as the main driver.  When asked what the main benefits of the M-Line/L-Line 
would be and who might experience them, participants mainly pointed to the streetcar serving as 
an economic development driver that would influence the real-estate market, increase property 
values, and increase the tax-base revenue for the city.  One interviewee responded: 
I think that it’s true that the Mayor has been upfront from the start of this process, and he 
often talks about this in his public comments about the streetcar: that it isn’t just a 
transportation project, we’ve been upfront that it’s also an economic development driver. 
Certainly, the City has trumpeted the fact that assessed values have gone up significantly 
more than city averages near the streetcar line. We’ve seen tremendous new 
developments near the streetcar line too, whether it’s hotels, housing, or offices. So, I 
mean, it’s clearly influencing the real-estate market, we’re seeing new development 
because of it. When you go down and ride the streetcar on the weekend, it’s clearly 
getting huge ridership from tourists, which is another group that will benefit from it. And 
over time, of course, we want it to become part of the regular day-to-day life, and it is. 
Obviously, to reach more people and more jobs, we will need to extend it over time. 
(31JD) 
 
The City of Milwaukee reported a 27.9% property value increase for properties located within a 
quarter-mile of the streetcar line since 2015, compared to the 13.4% average increase of property 
values citywide (Milwaukee, 2018).  Mayor Barrett attributed the increase to the streetcar:  
Of course, The Hop is a transportation asset. At the same time, it is an economic 
development tool, and we are seeing new construction and significant investments around 
The Hop stations. By adding to the economic strength of the center of Milwaukee, The 
Hop brings benefits throughout the city” (Milwaukee, 2018).   
 
Culver’s (2017) content analysis of the Milwaukee Streetcar (including several other streetcar 
systems in other cities) confirmed that the most prominent theme argued that the streetcar would 
be economically beneficial to the city: 
The predominant arguments were that streetcars would: help to spur economic 
development; encourage new commercial and residential investment; attract new 
residents, new talent, and new businesses; increase property values and the local tax base; 
strengthen the downtown; encourage revitalization; create jobs; increase tourism; make 
existing destinations even more attractive, and local businesses stronger; and benefit 







Culver also revealed how language in the Milwaukee Streetcar plans conveyed that the project 
was intended to “project an image of a modern and forward-thinking city” (p. 26), and was 
envisioned as a “world-class fixed transit network” (p. 26).  Choice-riders were also a point of 
emphasis for the project, as it was sought to:  
Provide a new perspective on quality transit in Milwaukee, and encourage people who 
previously did not see themselves as transit patrons to consider using all forms of transit 
and establish excellent transit as an important aspect of a high quality of life. (Culver, 
2017, p. 26) 
 
Furthermore, as a creative city development tool, the Milwaukee Streetcar plans predicted that 
the project would “attract and retain young talent needed to grow Milwaukee’s economy, support 
the creative class and fuel a culture of entrepreneurialism” (Culver, 2017, p. 27).  
Initial estimates for potential streetcar ridership were anticipated from downtown user 
statistics, including: “Over 1 million annual passengers at Intermodal Station; 77,500 daily 
downtown employees; 5,500,000 annual downtown visitors; 726,500 annual hotel stays; and 
14,900 downtown residents (and growing)” (CTSM, 2009).  Responding to public opposition 
prior to The Hop’s completion, Mayor Barrett pointed to the resistance that Miller Park garnered 
until people saw how much of a success it became after it was built, and suggested: 
It’s all going to be dependent on what people do when it opens a year from now, or a 
little over a year from now, whether people ride it. I’m very optimistic that people will 
ride it. That’s going to be the true test, whether people use it. (Keith, 2017) 
 
Through the first month of operation, the Milwaukee Streetcar totaled 76,125 rides through 
November, with 16,409 total rides during the opening weekend (Nov. 2-4), and averaging just 
2,297 daily ridership thereafter (Hop, 2018).  December saw a slight uptick in ridership data, 
with an average of 2,453 daily rides for The Hop (Hop, 2019).  In the cold month of January, 






statistics “due to glitches in the city system that tracks the data” (Ryan, 2019).  By comparison, 
Kansas City’s streetcar averaged 5,794 daily ridership in 2018, Portland’s streetcar averaged 
12,104 daily ridership figures, and Seattle’s streetcar averaged 4,800 daily rides.  
To encourage more ridership, The Hop partnered with TransLoc to develop a user-
friendly app that tracks the streetcar in real-time.  The app itself contains several other transit 
systems throughout the country.  Interesting enough, however, the real-time transit app 
exclusively tracks the streetcar and is not integrated with the MCTS bus system routes that 
would allow users to easily switch between the two transit modes.  Several interviewees also 
expressed that concern: 
That’s a little sample of the dysfunction, but that could rear its head in a really ugly way a 
year from now, because right now the streetcar is free. If all of a sudden, we get to the 
end of that Potawatomi free period and they start charging money and it’s not integrated 
with the bus system, I (and many other people) will stop using it. I have a bus pass in my 
pocket right now, and if I can’t hop off the bus downtown and step onto the streetcar and 
swipe that same pass-card, I’m done with the streetcar. (41JD) 
 
Likewise, another interviewee observed that “right now, there’s not a single bus route that is 
exactly parallel or on the same alignment as the streetcar route” (31JD).  Another stressed: 
One thing that I think will be very important is making sure that it is actually integrated 
with MCTS. Some of that is political will—because right now the city operates the 
streetcar and the county operates MCTS—so, some of it is going to be the political will 
with the city and the county getting along, because if you had one pass that gets you onto 
both, then you’ve just increased the value of someone who’s buying a monthly bus pass 
and you’ve also gotten ridership on the bus system via the streetcar, and that now creates 
the ridership and the political will to get more funding for the bus. (25JD) 
 
The most consistent responses among the concerns and critiques of the current route is its lack of 
connectivity and integration with the larger transportation network, the length (and location) of 
the route in regards to who it benefits and serves, and the opportunity costs of spending federal 






tourism-boosting amenity catered to an already affluent population (25JD; 31JD; 41JD).  For 
instance, one interviewee responded: 
To be completely frank, the streetcar is very cool. I’ve ridden it a bunch, I’ve taken my 
kids on it, I like it. What purpose it serves, and it's such a short singular route, I still have 
a lot of questions about. Most of the times I’ve used it, I’ve gone out of my way to use it. 
Like, it doesn’t serve my daily needs, and I’m a daily transit rider that goes between 
meetings in the central core of the city, so you’d think it would be perfect. I mean, I ride 
buses every day, and essentially most of the people on the buses—with the exception to 
downtown—are, some segment are college students, but the rest of it are low-income 
people who rely on the bus system. And I think we need to elevate that system and think 
of it as a larger amenity that supports our overall transit system. Thinking about it as a 
system and as a network, who it’s serving and how it’s serving those people, as opposed 
to these one-off debates or arguments. (41JD) 
 
A resident from northwest of downtown in the Sherman Park neighborhood conveyed that 
several other residents in the neighborhood also opposed the project:  
I walk the neighborhood all the time. There are folks, if you say ‘streetcar’ and you’re 
supporting the streetcar, they’d smack ya. There’s a whole kind of resentment. People go 
downtown and they see all this money being spent on a streetcar that really is not helping 
our neighborhood. Are you going to give us free rides (on a streetcar), or a transportation 
system that connects us to downtown? (Keith, 2017) 
 
The project, however, has not been without considerable widespread support from private 
sector developers who plan to develop along the route and contribute to the TIF districts that 
finance the streetcar, including the Mandel Group, Manpower Group, Johonson Controls, 
Wangard Partners, Carroll Properties, Stark Investments, and Barret Lo Visionary Development, 
to name a few (Jannene, 2014a).  As one interviewee mentioned:  
The downtown business community, in general, has been supportive of the streetcar. The 
Business Improvement District that represents the downtown businesses is one of the 
biggest supporters that I can think of because they know it will bring significant benefits 
to both the businesses and the residents of those neighborhoods. (31JD) 
 
For example, the Couture approval—a planned 44-story high-rise apartment building—was 
fundamental to securing additional funds for the streetcar construction costs, and is anticipated to 






million to the East Michigan Street TIF district (Horne, 2014).  The Couture will be located on a 
site that was used as a “bus barn” by the Downtown Transit Center, and when completed, will be 
a termination point for The Hop’s L-Line.  As one interviewee explained:  
The funds to build the official transit center that was on that site—and is now demolished 
to build the site for the Couture—there was federal FTA funding to pay for that project. 
So, when the Couture was proposed, one of the requirements from the FTA in order for 
the county to not have to pay back the funds that were given to the county to build the 
transit center, was that there would continue to be a transit plaza in the Couture. So, that 
was a major part of the project’s design since its inception, is that it will be a public 
transit plaza that will have a termination point for the streetcar, and will be a major public 
plaza—and the renderings show when it does get built, it will be a pretty stunning 
amenity for the public and a pretty stunning gateway to our lakefront. (31JD)    
 
Besides all the other aforementioned benefits that the M-Line and L-Line are expected to 
bring, other anticipated benefits important to note include reducing dependence on cars, 
increasing the walkability and livability of downtown and its surrounding neighborhoods, and 
establishing better connections from downtown to its surrounding neighborhoods (25JD; 31JD; 
36JD; 41JD; 55JD).  As one interviewee noted: 
Ultimately, the streetcar does make downtown more livable and ultimately more 
walkable. Just yesterday I was a having a conversation with someone who lives and 
works downtown, and they were saying that a lot of the people they know who live and 
spend a lot of time downtown are starting to walk more because the streetcar has gotten 
them to do that. Which seems crazy, but for a lot of people if you’re just in the routine of 
getting in your car to go everywhere, it takes something to pry that away. So, I think in 
that regard, the streetcar is serving some function of making downtown more walkable 
and livable. (41JD) 
 
Likewise, the streetcar is also expected to enhance the city’s image and place-branding: 
I think in Milwaukee we’re really trying to bolster our transit options. And service is 
really important, I think across the board, to our current bus service that the county offers, 
and I think the streetcar is really exciting because it offers a new option to people. I think 
it brings us closer to being a first-class city when you have a fixed-rail option. In general, 
I think the biggest issues are increasing the transit and moving forward to really offer 
those options to people through using the equity lens so that everyone benefits and 
everyone has options. Not just downtown but also the rest of the city. (55JD) 
 






The system only works if it expands as a transportation system. The one thing that people 
on both sides of the argument would often say is – there would be a lot of things that was 
not true – but one criticism that was definitely true was that it’s too short. It only works if 
it expands. So, in the short term, one of the stronger measurements of success other than 
ridership is increased tax base/increased property values. You know, it’s already in an 
area that’s already pretty high in property value, but it’s not so much the increase in 
existing property value (even though all of that matters), it’s the ability to drive new 
transit-oriented development – which is definitely one of the benefits. (25JD) 
 
To be able to establish better connections from downtown to its surrounding neighborhoods, 
however, as previously noted, the streetcar must extend out of downtown and become integrated 
with MCTS to create a more robust and connected transportation network throughout the region 
to benefit the more transit-dependent communities in Milwaukee. 
 
Milwaukee Streetcar: Convention Center Extension 
Additional expansion plans are underway (Figure 6).  In 2016, the Common Council 
approved an 0.75-mile extension line along 4th Street (renamed to Vel R. Phillips Aveune) from 
the Intermodal Station to the new Milwaukee Bucks arena, contingent on the city receiving 
another federal grant that would cover at least 50% of the estimated $40 million cost (Jannene, 
2016).  The other half of the costs would be covered by three additional TIF districts—$4 million 
from TID #39, $8 million from TID #41, and $8 million from newly created TID #88 (Jannene, 
2016).  While Milwaukee has been unsuccessful in its bid to secure additional federal funding for 
this extension, since the announcement that Milwaukee will host the 2020 Democratic National 
Convention (DNC) at the Wisconsin Center (located at Vel R. Phillips and Wisconsin Avenue), 
the city plans to use its $20 million TIF set aside to at least extend the line to the convention 
center (Zank, 2019).   
The 0.3-mile extension is anticipated to begin construction during the fall of 2019 and 














Alderman Bauman indicated that there is a huge sense of urgency to complete the streetcar 
expansion to the convention center prior to the DNC because, “Obviously, the existence of the 
streetcar was a big deal” (Zank, 2019).  Seemingly, this expansion was an integral part of 
securing the bid for the 2020 DNC, since the city signed a contract with the DNC that stipulates 
that the streetcar must be free during the days of the convention (Janenne, 2019; Zank, 2019).  
As one interviewee explained: 
As long as it will expand, I’m not going to be preventive about where it expands. So, if 
the political will is strong to expand it elsewhere, I’m happy to expand it in any direction. 
Right now, it looks like the strongest expansion likelihood would be up to the Wisconsin 
Convention Center, the DNC would push that. (25JD) 
 
Alderman Bauman admitted, “Some in Milwaukee might not place a big value on the streetcar, 
but obviously, people in Washington D.C. do” (Jannene, 2019).  The full 0.75-mile extension 
would have served as a starting point for the extension route heading north into the Bronzeville 
neighborhood. 
 
Milwaukee Streetcar: Bronzeville and Walker’s Point Extensions 
While there have been concerns of equitable-TOD (e-TOD) based on the locations of the 
first two phases (M-Line/L-Line) of Milwaukee’s streetcar system—including the Convention 
Center extension—the FTA awarded Milwaukee with a $750,000 grant to study potential 
neighborhood impacts if the streetcar were to extend into those communities.  The two 
neighborhoods targeted for this study were a potential extension from the Convention Center 
heading north along Dr. Martin Luther King Drive (MLK) into the Bronzeville neighborhood, 
and a potential extension heading south into Walker’s Point from the Third Ward (Figure 6).  As 






The FTA offered a Pilot Program for the first time, where they pretty much funded the 
vast majority of the study because they had the foresight to realize that as they had 
funded some of these transit projects around the country, there were some unfortunate 
issues that were accompanying them. That being housing issues and displacement issues 
of residents—and moving forward, they wanted to do this pilot program to find ways to 
remedy that. (55JD) 
 
Another interviewee expanded on the topic: 
The FTA has been clear and thoughtful of how they approached this by saying: ‘if we are 
going to be investing 10s or 100s of millions of dollars in local communities to build new 
transit, we want to make sure that those local communities first have done some planning 
to think about the impacts on development, think about the impacts on housing, on  
 
affordability, and the potential for displacement.’ So, in some ways, they’re being very 
progressive by saying: ‘we want to see that cities have steps in place that will both 
maximize the impact of the investment in transit, but also make sure that the investment 
is benefitting the people who it is designed to benefit and not displace them.’ (31JD) 
 
Future extensions of The Hop to Fiserv Forum and Bronzeville would use the Wisconsin Avenue 
extension, but if the streetcar is to be extended to Walker’s Point and Bronzeville using federal 
grants, the Common Council will need to authorize federally required alternative analysis studies 
of the proposed routes (Jannene, 2019).  Another interviewee explained how these studies were 
less about feasibility and more about impact: 
The Streetcar [M-Line/L-Line] was used as a catalyst before the study to get the money. 
Ultimately, the reason why I was excited to be a part of the e-TOD study is because, yes 
there are a lot of benefits for downtown having a streetcar, but for the rest of the city—
which is most of its residents—to realize those benefits, it must get out to the surrounding 
neighborhoods. So, that’s what the study was about. It was less about how do you get into 
the neighborhoods—it was more like, when it comes out to the neighborhoods, what does 
it mean for those neighborhoods, how do they change, how do we prepare for those 
changes, and what impacts and benefits do we want to see. Not so much about the 
streetcar itself and where it might go, and how we would get it there, that’s sort of a 
different conversation. This was more about land-uses, neighborhood benefits, 
community needs and priorities, and the neighborhood challenges, such as gentrification 
and displacement. (41JD) 
 
With the FTA grant, the city’s Department of City Development (DCD) hired an outside 






(including HR&A Advisors, SOM, and SB Friedman), and partnered with businesses and 
community organizations within both of the neighborhoods of the study areas (including the 
Historic King Drive BID, Historic Brewers Hill Association, Halyard Park Association, 
WestCare, and P3 Development Group from the Bronzeville neighborhoods; and the Harbor 
District, Inc., Walker’s Point Association, Soutside Organizing Center, and ABRAZO marketing 
from the Walker’s Point neighborhoods).  These studies are significant in the way in which they 
differ from the highly politicized procedures and developments of the initial phases of the 
streetcar routes, with a strong emphasis on community-informed planning and e-TOD with 
attention to anti-displacement measures.   
The MLK corridor and Bronzeville community encompasses the Harambee, Halyard 
Park, Brewers Hill, Schlitz Park, Hillside, and Haymarket neighborhoods.  The Historic MLK 
Drive has a strong African-American social, economic and cultural history and continues to be 
the home to many African-American owned businesses (Figure 7).  Over 20,000 residents from 
9,000 households live within a half-mile of the potential MLK alignment and adjacent tracks for 
the streetcar expansion (TOD MLK, 2018).  A market analysis study of the King Drive 
neighborhood found a population increase of 1,565 people between 2000 and 2015 (Figure 8)—
an increase of 2,300 White residents while the African-American population decreased by 1,200 
residents—and harbored poverty levels (33%) greater than the City of Milwaukee (25%) as a 
whole (Figure 9) (HR&A, 2018; TOD MLK, 2018).  The study also found that, while the area 
already supports a significant supply of affordable housing units, nearly 4,000 households (45% 
of the market) are housing burdened—spends more than 30% of income on housing—and 
predicts that “540 more households are likely to become housing burdened if rents increase due 














Figure 8: Bronzeville population changes and racial composition (Source: HR&A, 2018a) 
 






The Walker’s Point area is buttressed by the Harbor District, Historic Mitchell Street, and 
Walker’s Square, consisting of a mixture of former industrial and warehouse buildings, a 
traditional commercial corridor, single-family, duplex, and multi-family housing, with a 
significant Latino and Hispanic population (67.3%) and strong ties to the LGBTQ+ community 
(Figure 10) (TOD Walker’s Point, 2018).  Over 12,000 people from 5,100 households live within 
a half-mile of the potential alignment and adjacent tracks for the streetcar expansion along the 1st 
and 2nd Street corridors (Figure 11).  A market analysis of the Walker’s Point neighborhood 
found that despite a significant supply of affordable housing, over 2,000 households pay more 
than 30% of their income on housing and predicts that “525 more households are likely to 
become housing burdened if rents increase due to continuing market trends and the extension of 
the streetcar” (Figure 12) (HR&A, 2018b, p. 6). 
Furthermore, each of the respective neighborhoods also have low-rates of vehicle 
ownership (Figure 13; Figure 14), and have a strong need for more and better transit options.  As 
one interviewee put it: 
It’s also deeply socially unfair and economically unfair to say only if you can afford a 
car, afford car insurance, afford registration costs, afford gas, and afford car 
maintenance—all those things are an entry-level barrier to employment and even just 
social mobility. If you are someone who can’t afford a car, or maintain a car, then your 
options are limited. But as far as a public transportation system, in the long run, 
investments in public transportation should be a form of economic equity. (25JD) 
 
Another interviewee related social mobility to a skills and spatial mismatch of job locations: 
 
We obviously have a high number of individuals who are very, very low-income and 
often don’t have access to a car. So, making sure we have a reliable and extensive public 
transportation network, I think is critical. The other main challenge is we continue to 
have a spatial mismatch of areas were jobs growth is sometimes happening in areas that 
is very, very far from our population centers, and are not served well by transit. That’s a 
huge mismatch for the people who are likely to get those jobs and it makes their life a lot 
more difficult to have to figure a way to access a job. I think the bigger needs of public 
transit are to serve people who are dependent on it, but for us to have a robust transit 















Figure 11: Walker’s Point population changes and racial composition (Source: HR&A, 2018b) 
 







The market analysis of both communities confirmed such a skills and spatial mismatch of entry-
level job locations (Figure 15; Figure 16), finding that of the total jobs in the study area—41,400 
total jobs in Bronzeville and 12,800 total jobs in Walker’s Point—only 2% are filled by 
neighborhood residents, respectively (HR&A, 2018a, 2018b).  A “spatial mismatch” generally 
refers to spatial isolation of workers from jobs, whereas a “skills mismatch” means that there is a 
poor fit between the jobs available in these neighborhoods and the skills/qualifications that 
neighborhood residents bring to the labor market.  In this sense, both communities experience a 
skills mismatch of the types of jobs available, and a spatial mismatch to the low-skilled/entry-
level jobs located outside their study areas not served well by public transit.  
The anticipated benefits that the streetcar would bring to these communities include 
increasing mobility and accessibility to jobs centers with better connections across the 
surrounding neighborhoods, creating more walkable and livable neighborhoods, and creating 
more opportunities with more housing and retail options (25JD; 31JD; 36JD; 41JD; 55JD).  
Increases in property values was both seen as a benefit and as a burden.  As one interviewee 
responded: 
Another benefit is most likely an increase of development that has the potential to bring 
an increase in property values, which can benefit current owners, but it’s a double-edge 
sword. If you own a place, you are able to benefit from the increase in value which 
increases your overall wealth in equity. And though, again, it can be a double-edge sword 
and it could become more costly for some, and some people may not be able to afford 
where they are living now. That can become an issue that we have to be very cognizant 
about. (55JD) 
 
Other potential burdens include maintaining affordability for both housing and businesses, 
drastic neighborhood change (including changes to the cultural character of the neighborhoods), 
increase of parking pressure, and burdens felt by businesses during construction, but often the 























Figure 15: Spatial skills mismatch of jobs serving Walker’s Point residents (Source: HR&A, 2018b) 
 






Along with these possible benefits and burdens in mind, the e-TOD planning processes 
utilized community outreach to maximize involvement to not only make sure that the streetcar 
will be equitable and benefits everyone without leading to displacement, but also to establish the 
community needs and priorities, and to make sure that the streetcar is something the 
communities want to see in their neighborhoods.  Interview participants noted that the 
community outreach was an extensive and engaged process, including online surveys, door-to-
door canvassing, presence at community events (including festivals, farmer’s markets, art-round 
tables, and setting up tables at grocery stores), five large public meetings, and employed a large 
public involvement team of community organizations, as well as having a Stakeholder Advisory 
Committee with over 50 people of professionals from all areas of expertise (31JD; 36JD; 41JD; 
55JD. As one interviewee noted: 
We had probably the most extensive community engagement effort we’ve ever done in 
many of our planning processes. And I think the results spoke for themselves as far as 
how many people were engaged in the process, the different types of engagement, and the 
fact that there was pretty consistent support for the plan once it was unveiled in both the 
neighborhoods that were the focus of the study. (31JD) 
 
The communities’ priorities, in many ways, overlapped with the priorities of the extension 
studies, including maintaining affordable housing and affordable businesses, bringing in more 
neighborhood-serving retail, building density, and maintaining the cultural identity of the 
neighborhoods (31JD; 36JD; 41JD; 55JD).   
While there is clearly a need for expanded public transit options in each neighborhood, 
both communities exhibit indicators for potential displacement and gentrification—i.e., increase 
in residential property values and loss of low-income households (Figure 17); and decrease in 
people of color and increase in household incomes (Figure 18) (HR&A, 2018a, 2018b).  For the 




















extension of the streetcar, attention to housing affordability strategies will need to be explored to 
prevent displacement of current residents (DCD, 2018).  The city recognized these concerns and 
has given considerable attention and commitment to an anti-displacement strategy, representative 
of the Milwaukee Common Council Resolution #171143 that directed the DCD to prepare an 
Anti-Displacement Plan for the Neighborhoods Surrounding Downtown Milwaukee:  
Milwaukee’s skyline is changing on a monthly basis due to the rapid pace of new 
construction and while the downtown building boom brings many improvements to the 
city, including more people and an expanded tax-base, it may also kill some cultural 
traditions and diversity, the precise characteristics that make Milwaukee so dynamic and 
desirable in the first place ... Development should not dismantle and displace existing 
neighborhoods and communities in order to make way for new residents ... DCD must 
ensure that its economic revitalization efforts for Milwaukee include policies that help 
poorer residents. (DCD, 2018, p. 4) 
 
One interviewee explained that the Anti-Displacement Plan was done in conjunction with the e-
TOD plans and the market analyses of the respective neighborhoods, even though it is a stand-
alone plan on its own (55JD).  Not only does the plan establish a baseline of metrics and 
indicators to measure the risk of displacement and gentrification for Census Tracts of Milwaukee 
neighborhoods, but it also elevates the discussion of the historical role of institutional racism and 
government’s role in crafting policy to address displacement. As another interviewee explained: 
I think in some ways the Common Council Resolution speaks for itself, and the council 
members were hearing from their constituents concerns with this idea that with all this 
new development happening: ‘am I going to be able to stay in the neighborhood?’ And I 
think there’s a few things driving that. I think there’s this perception that there was a lot 
of speculation—perhaps people who were acting predatorily—and obviously because of 
the history in both our city and the country, I think that does get people concerned about 
displacement and government’s role in the past: government’s role in fostering 
displacement of communities of color. (31JD) 
 
The focus of the Anti-Displacement Plan is to strike a balance between preventing displacement 
of low-income and minority groups, with the need for attracting new investment and increasing 






City of Milwaukee policymakers should prioritize choice and equity alongside traditional 
development goals. Prioritizing choice means recognizing that as development occurs, 
policies and programs should be crafted to minimize the potential for displacement of 
existing residents and businesses that want to remain in their communities. Prioritizing 
equity means that anti-displacement policies and related programs should be intentionally 
designed to ensure that historically disadvantaged groups are also able to benefit from 
and gain access to the wealth-building opportunities provided by development occurring 
in the city neighborhoods. (DCD, 2019, p. 8) 
 
In this regard, the goal of the plan is not to stop neighborhood change or put up barriers to 
investment, but to elevate the discussion of these issues and explore strategies to address and 
mitigate displacement.   
In doing so, the Anti-Displacement Plan investigated national best-practices of policies 
and programs that address the topics of displacement and gentrification, and is complete with a 
list of 19 recommendations and strategies that are also incorporated into the respective e-TOD 
Plans.  However, as one interviewee acknowledged, the existence of a plan does not mean the 
problem has been solved: 
While there’s a growing knowledge of how to kind of best anticipate and prepare for, and 
hopefully take steps to mitigate that type of risk—there’s no municipality that has been 
able to bring that risk down to zero. I think sometimes there’s places that have been able 
to be really thoughtful and good about how to help make sure people understand the goal 
is not to displace communities or individuals—and I think those are all the steps that we 
would be taking as the city. But none of it is easy. I don’t want to pretend that it’s 
problem solved. I mean, these are all complex challenges that other cities around the 
country are all dealing with. (31JD) 
 
Of the studied national-best practices, the main strategy that the city is pursuing is to create a 
Strategic Acquisition Fund that essentially puts together a pool of funds to acquire properties 
before they go up in value, and hold them for future affordable housing developments (31JD; 
36JD; 41JD; 55JD).  There are a lot of challenges for addressing issues of displacement and 
gentrification in Wisconsin because a lot of the tools that are employed in other communities 






one of the more commonly used tools recently that is illegal in Wisconsin has been inclusionary 
zoning, which basically mandates that any new housing development in the area must include a 
certain percentage of housing to be affordable housing (41JD).  In that sense, the Strategic 
Acquisition Fund is a work-around for the city to be able to make deals with the developers that 
purchase their acquired properties to include a certain percentage of affordable housing, without 
requiring it by law (55JD).  Another strategy from the Anti-Displacement Plan’s list of 
recommendations was explained by one interviewee: 
The Common Council passed another directing resolution to study the creation of an anti-
displacement tax fund. The simple idea there would be: whatever your taxes are today, 
those will be your taxes for the next 20 years, and even if your assessed value and the tax 
rate go up, some funding source will be identified to cover that difference so that 
government and our partners can make that commitment to people that rising taxes are 
not something that’s going to be forcing people out of their home. The model that we’ve 
been asked to study and try to figure out how to implement locally is the model that was 
employed in Atlanta. Atlanta has a similar structure that we do here in Wisconsin—
because of the uniformity clause that we have in our State Constitution, it requires the 
city to tax everyone equally. So, that’s why the city can’t do certain things that you might 
see in other states as far as like abatements or different tax treatments for different groups 
of individuals. (31JD) 
 
In Atlanta, they were successful in identifying non-city funding sources from a combination of 
big businesses and foundations who thought it was important enough to develop mixed-income 
housing in areas that were seeing the potential for displacement, specifically surrounding the area 
of the Atlanta Falcons new stadium (31JD).  In Wisconsin, virtually the only tools that have been 
available due to the existing state laws have been Low-Income Housing Tax Credit projects, 
Section 8 housing vouchers, and tax-incremental financing, all of which have concerns of their 
own (41JD).  Overall, most interview participants expressed that the main challenges for solving 
affordable housing, mitigating pressures of displacement, and overcoming barriers for equitable 
development all come back to the revenue structure and the limited tools available for the city 






Together with the Anti-Displacement Plan and the e-TOD Plans for each neighborhood, 
the City of Milwaukee is making a deliberate effort to address and define what TOD means for 
the city and its neighborhoods: 
There is a growing realization that equity needs to be at the foundation of planning for 
Transit Oriented Development. While new development has many positives, including 
new housing and shopping options in the community and increased tax base for the City, 
the benefits of new development—including TOD—are not always distributed equally. 
For that reason, this process included candid conversations about who may benefit from 
new development and redevelopment, what can be done to minimize and mitigate any 
potentially negative effects to current residents, and to find those opportunities to move 
forward the community’s vision for the neighborhood. At the most fundamental level, 
equitable growth means that development benefits and does not displace either current 
residents or the cultural character of neighborhoods and that historically disadvantaged 
groups are able to gain access to wealth building opportunities by investments in transit 
and Transit Oriented Development. (TOD MLK, 2018; TOD Walker’s Point, 2018, p. 11) 
 
Each of the e-TOD plans presents the community engagement, input, and aspirations processes; 
a physical planning framework for key corridors, connectors and nodes of the neighborhoods; 
identifies strategic places of focus and recommendations; and highlights policies, programs, and 
actions complete with an implementation strategy and timeframe to actualize the goals and 
recommendations of the plan into reality (TOD MLK, 2018; TOD Walker’s Point, 2018).  The 
plan’s recommendations included zoning code changes of land-uses to accommodate higher-
densities, parks and open spaces, and mixed-use and mixed-income housing; minimizing 
displacement through affordable housing; and streetscape improvements to encourage 
walkability and to make neighborhoods more bicycle and pedestrian-friendly (36JD).  As one 
interviewee summarized the goals of the studies: 
The goals were really about equity, and equitable growth for the community. And I think 
that the city was really proactive about it. Often, what happens is that people are thinking 
and talking about transit-oriented development and they talk about all the benefits in 
terms of the development it would bring and the vitality it would bring—new jobs, new 
retail, new opportunities—but people are not thinking about the housing burdens and 
gentrification. So, I think the city was a step ahead of the game and they were thinking 






streetcar comes in and there is no plan for the community, then the development sort of 
rules the game and then the city and the planning departments are really playing catch-
up—but here, they wanted to make sure that they could take the time, first of all, to put a 
plan in place with the community’s vision, the community’s needs, and making sure that 
all of these community needs were already integrated beforehand—before the streetcar 
came. So, I think that they were really ahead of the game in that sense, and I personally 
think that really helps in not having any negative impacts because you’re prepared. 
(36JD) 
 
In this regard, given the fact that these neighborhood plans have yet to be equipped with the 
federal funding to bring the streetcar into their communities, at the very least, the studies alone 
can move forward with streetscape improvements and provides valuable metrics that establish 
the community needs and priorities.  
 
DISCUSSION 
Comparative Analysis between Initial and Extension Routes 
 At this point, it becomes clear that the initial streetcar routes (including the M-Line, L-
Line, and Wisconsin Center extension) were engaged in very different planning and conceptual 
processes than the Bronzeville and Walker’s Point extension studies.  While some may argue 
that the streetcar’s original alignments may have concerns of equity—including the opportunity 
costs in consideration of the distribution of burdens and benefits—the original funding required 
that it must connect with the Intermodal Station and restricted other possibilities.  There was 
some community outreach for the M-Line routing and “locally preferred alternative routes” were 
created (though, not adopted), but the highly-politicized debates surrounding the streetcar’s 
inception prohibited further analysis and engagement outside of the realm of politics.   
The regime politics, if you will, broke down the growth coalition to such a degree, that at 
a certain point all that mattered was to build the streetcar in some capacity.  This is evident 






envisioned as being part of a larger, holistic network of heavy-rail, commuter-rail, light-rail, and 
buses.  Seemingly, when the high-speed rail project got squashed under Governor Walker, so did 
the feasibility of a holistic vision for a robust transit network that would have incorporated all 
four technologies.  As such, allocated federal funds were being dissipated and peeled off for 
other projects, and there became a sense of urgency to utilize the limited funds remaining before 
the federal government retracted them completely, regardless of its integration with the bus 
network and equitable development impacts.  What was left was enough funding to build a 2.1-
mile starter system, and to maximize the city’s return on investment (along with the Intermodal 
connection stipulation and the utility costs provision) we got the alignment that we have today.  
It can also be argued that the initial M-Line and L-Line routes served as a catalyst for 
both the Wisconsin Center extension and the e-TOD studies, although from two very different 
processes.  There is no denying that the streetcar played an integral role in securing the bid for 
the 2020 DNC, realized from a creative city development template.  In this regard, the streetcar 
served to not only recast its image to outsiders, but propelled itself to a national stage that will 
only continue to further enhance the name and image recognition of Milwaukee, not to mention 
the surge of tourism adjoined with the DNC.  The creation of an additional TID (along with the 
extension of two preexisting TIDs) to finance the 0.3-mile extension for an event that only lasts 
one weekend also raises concerns for equitable development.  While the streetcar is currently 
free to ride through the first year of operation from the Potawatomi Hotel & Casino 
sponsorship—and with Milwaukee’s bid to host the 2020 DNC being contingent on extending 
the streetcar to the Wisconsin Center and providing free rides during the convention—it is 






Point communities, there is no guarantee that the streetcar will be made free for the transit-
dependent populations for any period of time.   
The Bronzeville and Walker’s Point extension studies, on the other hand, were quite 
depoliticized compared to the other phases.  Granted, while the $750,000 FTA grant for the e-
TOD studies was also contingent on Milwaukee having a streetcar in the first place, there was a 
clear recognition of the potential negative impacts that TOD can have on historically 
disenfranchised communities.  Unlike the initial routes, the extension studies had a strong 
emphasis on e-TOD, overcoming barriers to equity, and mitigating pressures of displacement.  
The studies were very intentional about e-TOD to such an extent that the community engagement 
process was unique and meaningful for establishing the visions and goals towards creating 
equitable outcomes of TOD (e-TOD).  
 
Racial Equity Impact Assessment 
While the benefits of extending the streetcar into Bronzeville and Walker’s Point would 
include connecting more people to jobs in these different communities, and brining more people 
into these communities—clearly, the burdens are that the increase in property values could cause 
issues of displacement and gentrification down the line.  The city recognized these concerns and 
are giving it considerable attention, and prepared an Anti-Displacement Plan for the 
neighborhoods to strategize how to mitigate these concerns.  In their investigation of national 
best-practices, the Anti-Displacement Plan also specifically explored the racial equity literature 
of the Local and Regional Government Alliance on Race and Equity (GARE) material and 
incorporated the Racial Equity Impact Assessment (REIA) and GARE toolkits (DCD, 2018, 






assessments were conducted prior to implementation of the project proposal to inform the 
decision-making processes for these communities.  Data was developed to measure indicators of 
potential displacement and gentrification.  The city is taking in what people in that community 
are saying, and they are reaching out to the community in such a capacity that has not been done 
before in Milwaukee.  The studies also incorporated an analysis of the benefits and burdens of 
the streetcar entering these communities, and developed strategies for advancing racial equity 
and mitigating unintended consequences.  There is a plan in place for implementation, and there 
is also continual community engagement, even after the studies have been completed to 
streamline communication and retain accountability.   
From an analysis of the planning documents and stakeholder interviews, the benefits and 
burdens all lead to the same conclusions: yes, there are a lot of potential benefits that can come 
out, but there are also a lot of potential burdens too, and unmitigated burdens are just going to 
create more equity problems than we have now, and that is exactly what we do not want to do 
because that defeats the entire purpose of the e-TOD studies.  We know that the government is 
reaching out to communities and that they do care about what could happen as a result of 
extending the streetcar into their neighborhoods, and that is an important step in the right 
direction because we want people in government to care about what happens to people in these 
communities.  However, deep down, listening to these concerns does not mean that the city is 
actively solving any problems or coming up with any solutions yet, and many of the strategies 
are still raw and underdeveloped.  Ultimately, trying to solve for these affordable housing issues 
is essential for equitable development.  Otherwise, we are going to see the brunt of the changes 
and negative impacts of new development, new investment, and new density being borne by the 






right now, we do not have any good answers for that.  Frankly, no city has yet to solve that issue.  
And this is where these questions of equity are still hanging out there without any good answers.   
 
Implications for Equitable Development 
Now that we know what these potential burdens and benefits are, the question remains as 
to how we are going to address them.  One problem is that TOD is still rooted in the neoliberal 
habitus of development.  TOD is a market-driven development strategy which is essentially 
about growth being considered a good thing, irrespective of negative externalities.  This is one of 
the huge challenges that exists in the planning and development field: well-meaning people don’t 
always create outcomes that are equitable.  They could be well-intentioned, but they are also part 
of a systemic set of decision-making that, even though their intentions are good, the outcomes 
may not be equitable.  The point is, e-TOD is difficult largely because the neoliberal ideological 
frame is so narrow and constrained.  The pragmatics of TOD are not what we should be 
contending with—what we should be contending with is the lens through which we make our 
decisions, and the ultimate distribution of the benefits and burdens of those decisions—
irrespective of the pragmatics (because democracy requires we do that, even if it is hard).   
Built inside that is also this neoliberal thinking that is embedded in development about 
capitalism as a form of production—that it is always given the benefit of the doubt as the 
positive means by which we produce outcomes in our society—and some of us have been given 
the privilege to interpret those in a positive way continuously.  Those who are negatively 
affected by it on a regular basis, however, might have a different opinion.  So, part of the 
struggle, and why we call it “neoliberal,” is because it is a struggle within a paradigm of our 






growth and good byproducts that will benefit us all (underlined as the assumption that it is going 
to benefit us all, generally).   
From an economic development vantage point, it is because the mandates of the market 
have their own imperatives, even in the face of good people trying to do the right thing.  It is that 
neoliberal thinking about the positives of market forces, and the failure to fully appreciate how 
they have had such negative consequences for many communities is what allows us to say, “Well 
look at how difficult it is, look at the pragmatics.”  Pragmatically, wherever the streetcar goes is 
going to increase the walkability and livability of neighborhoods, therefore, it will benefit 
everyone in the community.  However, that also presumes that the streetcar in it of itself as a 
development tool can be isolated from the overarching objectives of development patterns that 
have historically happened in cities and have historically been manifested in our planning 
practices.  TOD does not sit outside of that, and in fact, I would argue that the streetcar as a 
development strategy, is a strategy of attracting from the outside, not a strategy of building from 
the inside.  If you consider the streetcar as a development tool, it is about how it can attract 
people from the outside-in, not addressing the needed issues of the individuals inside the 
community, because what it is fundamentally (besides a transportation amenity), is an attraction.   
 Thus, it is critical to understand the economic development literature in order to know 
what the historical tensions and challenges have been because there is a long-line of analysis in 
the economic development field about the problems associated with these long-standing 
practices and strategies that do not explicitly contemplate the distribution of benefits and 
burdens.  In particular, the distribution of benefits and burdens must be considered when it 
comes to using enormous amounts of public resources, because if those public resources are 






however, poses another problem within the circular logic of neoliberal capitalism which would 
argue: development itself as a capitalistic endeavor will benefit the “greater good” because they 
are attached to a certain number of presumptions—such as growth and the attraction of capital 
will create new jobs (but rarely does it ask, for whom?), or that it is going to expand the tax-base 
(but rarely has it asked, what are the implications of that for those who exist in those 
communities in which that is happening?), or that it is going to create a new set of political 
relationships and PPPs (often ignoring that those new sets of relationships are because 
communities turnover from displacement).  Not considering these factors is a failure of our 
ability to understand how opportunity is distributed in urban space, and what continues to sustain 
and create the reproduction of inequalities.  Thus, it is the realignment of resources, the 
realignment of peoples, and the realignment of those individuals with certain ideologies of urban 
space (in the absence of calling the questions) that (re)produces the replication of the (in)equities 
that we say we want to mitigate.   
Another problem is rooted in the revenue structures of the city, the state, and at the 
federal levels.  The city is very reliant on property taxes in terms of funding, and raising 
additional funds is always difficult and forces cities to be creative about it, and often enter 
various PPPs that compromise equitable values.  For instance, Wisconsin’s Uniformity Clause 
prevents municipalities from taxing property taxes differently for different individuals, but TIFs 
are an exception to that clause.  At its most fundamental level, TIFs are tax abatements given to 
developers for major real-estate development projects.  When Wisconsin adopted TIF legislation 
in 1975, it intended to solve issues of equity by encouraging development to occur in blighted 
areas of urban neighborhoods, or an area receiving development challenges, and that the 






of funds that cities use for TOD projects have been shrinking at federal and state levels over the 
last few years, and because of those funding constraints, Milwaukee has had to use its TIFs to 
fund the construction of the streetcar.  Doing so limits the city’s ability to use that same TIF for 
other uses in the TID around the streetcar, and that is one of the sources that might be used to 
implement some of the e-TOD recommendations.  Thus, if the city is using all the increment 
from the increased tax-base to pay for the streetcar itself, then it limits what else they can do with 
it for other neighborhood or community improvements.  This is again, a challenge of the city’s 
limited funding sources for transit, and not having a Regional Transit Authority or a dedicated 
sales tax for transit has given the city limited flexibility to address local needs and use different 
tools to do that.  One of the biggest problems moving forward, is that there are a lot of barriers at 
the state level that prohibits many of the tools that addresses equitable affordable housing issues.  
Therefore, it is crucial to lobby the State of Wisconsin lawmakers—whether its state-shared 
revenue, or the ability to do different kinds of funding structures for transit or affordable housing 
that several other municipalities in other states do—to see major policy changes that allows local 
governments to take steps for protecting residents in these communities that may experience 
TOD, and the burdens associated with them. 
From the outside looking in, all the associated benefits with the streetcar and TOD seem 
great, and it makes Milwaukee more attractive by adding new public transit amenities and 
establishing better connections across neighborhoods.  However, it also poses the threat of 
causing displacement and gentrification by attracting a more affluent and White population into 
these communities, while pushing African-American and Latino populations further out.  Which 
unfortunately leads to the same problems, but two-miles further north or south.  Obviously, with 






potentially be devastating for the low-income families who rely on public transportation the most 
and should be benefitting the most.  The revenue structures at the federal, state, and local 
levels—including several of Wisconsin’s state laws—present barriers to achieving e-TOD in 
Milwaukee.  None of this is to say that Milwaukee should not continue to pursue the expansion 
of the streetcar to achieve equitable development.  However, until those barriers are addressed 
and the proper tools are identified and developed that distribute the benefits and burdens of TOD 
equitably, Milwaukee will continue to exhibit uneven development in its neighborhoods and 
communities.  
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 This research investigated the Milwaukee Streetcar as a creative city TOD tool, and 
examined its implications for equitable development.  This research also unpacked the historical 
context of the political regimes and coalition building which brought the streetcar to Milwaukee 
in the first place.  The findings of this research revealed that the initial streetcar routes (M-Line, 
L-Line, and Wisconsin Center extension) align with the creative city development template 
wherein its primary function serves as an economic development tool, along with the secondary 
functions of place-making and image-branding, while transportation benefits were tertiary.  This 
was evident with its lack of integration with the MCTS bus network.  The benefits of these initial 
streetcar routes are thus localized in the downtown central business district, wherein the majority 
of the benefits accrue to private developers, property owners, and the city from increased 
assessed property values.  Other benefits include the expansion of multi-modal transit options 
and enhanced livability and walkability for the more affluent residents that live in the downtown 






opportunity costs of transit-dependent populations in the surrounding communities whom rely on 
public transit amenities the most, while the city’s scare resources and political capital are 
extracted for the downtown streetcar. 
 On the other hand, the findings of this research also revealed that the potential streetcar 
extension lines to Bronzeville and Walker’s Point entailed a very different planning and political 
process than its predecessor.  With a focus on e-TOD and careful attention to anti-displacement 
strategies, the city’s planners and policymakers exhibited a clear intention to mitigate pressures 
of displacement that could result from the expansion of the streetcar, prior to its inception in their 
communities.  The potential benefits of expanding the streetcar into these neighborhoods could 
be great for the residents and businesses alike, however it could also be catastrophic to the 
cultural character if the burdens of TOD are borne by these communities, and the residents and 
businesses become displaced.  While good intentions are not enough to mitigate pressures of 
displacement and overcome barriers to equity, the city’s policymakers would do best by lobbying 
the State of Wisconsin’s lawmakers to change several of the preexisting laws that limit the city’s 
tools and resources to address these concerns.   
 This research has made a significant contribution to the existing literature on TOD by 
way of a political-economic analysis of the Milwaukee Streetcar case study through an equity 
lens, including an examination of its social effects of the benefits and burdens of accessibility, 
and its implications for equitable development.  Other cities and communities could do well by 
incorporating the lessons and insights learned from this Milwaukee Streetcar case study as a 
model for e-TOD moving forward.  Milwaukee’s e-TOD extension studies lay the foundation for 
extensive community engagement and involvement throughout the entirety of the planning 






mitigating pressures of displacement.  Other externalities previously mentioned could pose 
problems for Milwaukee to incorporate those tools and implement the full extent of these plans, 
but other cities that do not have those same barriers could still move forward using Milwaukee as 
a case study for e-TOD. 
Limitations of this study include the restricted time-frame of this research, and an under-
representation of the business community stakeholders in interviews.  Interviewees were broadly 
represented across sectors, although, it could have been useful to have more voices incorporated 
into this study.  Time-frame restrictions of this research also affected the number of interviews 
that could be conducted.  The Milwaukee Streetcar is also still very new, and the time-frame of 
its operation limited the effects of the streetcar that could be measured.  Recommendations for 
future research would include measuring the impacts and effects of the streetcar and its 
surrounding communities in the years to come.  It would also be interesting to investigate—when 
and if these future extension lines are in place—how it will affect ridership, if it will become 
effectively integrated with the MCTS bus network, and in 10 years from now, wherein the 
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Semi-Structured Interview Questions 
General Questions 
1. How are you involved in mass transit and transportation planning in Milwaukee? 
 
2. What do you see as the most important transportation issues in Milwaukee? 
 
3. Why did the streetcar become the priority for implementation? 
 
M-Line/L-Line Questions 
4. How have private funders/stakeholders been involved in planning decisions and 
implementation? 
 
5. What has been the role of other businesses, government agencies, and community groups 
in project planning and implementation? 
 
6. Has anyone opposed the project, and if so, who? 
 
7. What do you think the most important three benefits are from the M-Line/L-Line and 
who will experience them? 
 
8. What do you think the most important three negative consequences (or burdens) are from 
the M-Line/L-Line and who will experience them? 
 
9. How will the project impact low-income and minority groups?   
 
10. What, if any, measures have been taken to integrate their needs into the project?   
 
11. What are the community priorities? 
 
MLK/Walker’s Point Extension Questions  
12. Who was the driver for the equitable transit-oriented development (eTOD) studies and 
extension plans?  How was the FTA grant received, who applied and why? 
 
13. How have private funders/stakeholders been involved in planning decisions and 
implementation? 
 
14. What has been the role of other businesses, government agencies, and community groups 
in project planning and implementation? 
 
15. Has anyone opposed the project, and if so, who? 
 
16. What do you think the most important three benefits are from the MLK/Walker’s Point 







17. What do you think the most important three negative consequences (or burdens) are from 
the MLK/Walker’s Point Extension-Lines and who will experience them? 
 
18. How will the project impact low-income and minority groups?   
 
19. What, if any, measures have been taken to integrate their needs into the project?   
 
20. What are the community priorities? 
 
Equitable TOD Questions 
21. How has the thinking and perspectives differed between the two different planning 
processes (M-Line/L-Line versus MLK/Walker’s Point Extension-Lines)? 
 
22. How is the city planning on mitigating pressures of displacement? 
 
23. What do you see as the key barriers to making sure that TOD projects like the streetcar 
foster equity?  
 
24. Does the speed of the planning process undermine democratic participation?   
 
25. How does the speed of the planning process effect the community engagement process, 
sample size, and community representation for democratic participation? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
